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In recent years, Congress has exercised its authority under Article I of the
United States Constitution to enact legislation covering a number of new fields.
In 1996, for example, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”)1 and reined in the authority of the federal courts to grant remedial
relief in prison reform litigation. That same year, Congress also enacted the
landmark Telecommunications Act of 19962 and brought the Nation’s
telecommunications industry under its watchful eye. This trend is likely to
continue into the future, particularly if Congress enacts federal legislation to
govern the activities of the tobacco industry.3
These pieces of legislation are in many respects unremarkable. Congress
often brings new industries or subjects into the universe of those already
governed by federal law. Moreover, each statute would seem to be a permissible
1. Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 802, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (Supp.
III 1997)).
2. Pub L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
3. Congress recently has considered a number of bills concerning the manufacture, marketing, and
distribution of tobacco products. See, e.g., Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong.
(1998); Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1414, 105th Cong. (1998); Preventing Addiction to
Smoking Among Teens Act, S. 1648, 105th Cong. (1998); Kids Deserve Freedom from Tobacco Act of
1998, S. 1889, 105th Cong.; Teen Tobacco Use Prevention Act of 1998, H.R. 3889, 105th Cong.;
Tobacco Products Control Act of 1997, S. 201, 105th Cong.; Tobacco Disclosure and Warning Act of
1997, S. 527, 105th Cong.; Tobacco Disclosure and Warning Act of 1997, H.R. 1244, 105th Cong. Other
bills concern restrictions on second-hand smoke. See, e.g., A Bill To Reduce Exposure to Environmental
Tobacco Smoke, S. 2066, 105th Cong. (1998); Smoke-Free Environment Act of 1997, S. 826, 105th
Cong.; Smoke-Free Environment Act of 1997, H.R. 1771, 105th Cong. Much of this legislation is
directed at discouraging minors from smoking. See, e.g., Healthy Kids Act, S. 1638, 105th Cong. (1998);
Placing Restraints on Tobacco’s Endangerment of Children and Teens Act, S. 1530, 105th Cong. (1998);
Tobacco Use By Minors Deterrence Act of 1997, S. 1238, 105th Cong.; Bipartisan No Tobacco for Kids
Act of 1998, H.R. 3868, 105th Cong.; International Tobacco Responsibility Act, H.R. 3478, 105th Cong.
(1998); Healthy Kids Act, H.R. 3474, 105th Cong. (1998); Healthy and Smoke Free Children Act, H.R.
3028, 105th Cong. (1998); Tobacco Use By Minors Deterrence Act of 1997, H.R. 2017, 105th Cong.;
Healthy and Smoke Free Children Act, S. 1492, 105th Cong. (1997); No Tobacco For Kids Act, S. 828,
105th Cong. (1997); Stop Kids from Smoking Act, H.R. 3298, 105th Cong. (1997); Control Youth
Access to Tobacco Act, H.R. 2594, 105th Cong. (1997); Tobacco Use By Minors Deterrence Act of
1997, H.R. 2034, 105th Cong.; No Tobacco for Kids Act, H.R. 1772, 105th Cong. (1997); Youth
Protection from Tobacco Addiction Act of 1997, H.R. 762, 105th Cong.; Youth Smoking Prevention Act
of 1997, H.R. 516, 105th Cong.
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exercise of Congress’s legislative power: The Telecommunications Act and any
future tobacco legislation would seem to fall safely within Congress’s broad
power under the Commerce Clause “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States.”4 The PLRA would seem to fall within Congress’s power to
“ordain and establish” the “inferior [federal] Courts.”5 What makes this
legislation unusual is that the subject matter of each law was already subject to
regulation by one or more judicial consent decrees at the time Congress elected
to assert its regulatory authority.
When the PLRA took effect in 1996, for example, the federal courts had
already exercised their remedial authority to issue consent decrees covering the
administration of prisons in more than thirty states.6 Simil rly, at the time the
Telecommunications Act became law, the major participants in the telephone
industry were already governed by a series of consent decrees administered by
the District Court of the District of Columbia: the AT&T Consent Decree
regulated the participation of AT&T and its Bell operating companies in various
telecommunications markets,7 the GTE Consent Decree regulated that
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States.”).
The Court has found that Congress has the power to enact laws regulating the tobacco industry. See,
e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (upholding federal Tobacco Inspection Act’s preemption
of Georgia law that required different method of classifying tobacco crops).
Congress’s Commerce Power also covers the telecommunications industry. Congress clearly has
authority over interstate telephone lines. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941) (noting
that “interstate telephone, telegraph and wireless communication” are “concededly” within “the
application of the commerce clause”); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 356 (1887)
(“intercourse by the telegraph between the states is interstate commerce”). This authority encompasses
intrastate lines as well because telephone networks form a single integrated network. See Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986) (“virtually all telephone plant that is used to provide
intrastate service is also used to provide interstate service, and is thus conceivably within the jurisdiction
of both state and federal authorities”). While it is true that Congress has erected a presumption against the
federal regulation of “intrastate communication service[s],” 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994), it is well
established that the line between intrastate and interstate service is of congressional and not constitutional
origin. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999) (Congress has authority to give FCC intrastate
rulemaking power); Illinois Pub. Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 562 (D.C. Cir.) (finding that
Congress, in section 276 of the Act, granted FCC “authority to regulate the rates for local coin calls [from
payphones]”), clarified on reh’g, 123 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1361 (1998).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”);
see also Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (“There can be no question of the power
of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.”).
6. See Richard J. Costa, The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Legitimate Attempt To
Curtail Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits and End the Alleged Micro-Management of State Prisons or a
Violation of Separation of Powers?, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 319, 328-29 & nn.46-47 (1997).
7. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p53 Hoffstadt.doc 05/20/99   12:00 PM
56 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:53
company’s activities in the local and long-distance markets,8 and the AT&T-
McCaw Decree regulated AT&T’s acquisition of McCaw Cellular
Communications.9 By the time Congress enacts national tobacco legislation, a
number of States will have entered into consent decrees with the major tobacco
companies; Florida, Texas, Mississippi, and Minnesota already have entered
into consent decrees with the tobacco companies10 and the remaining states are
likely to enter into decrees pursuant to the November 1998 Multistate
Settlement with the Tobacco Industry.11
Thus, as part of both the PLRA and the Telecommunications Act, Congress
was forced to contend with these outstanding decrees. In the PLRA, Congress
mandated the termination of outstanding decrees unless the federal courts that
issued them find that the decrees satisfy the new congressional standard.12 In the
Telecommunications Act, Congress terminated the prospective effect of the
three prior decrees by providing that “[a]ny conduct or activity that was, before
the date of enactment of this Act, subject to any restriction or obligation
imposed by” any of the decrees would, after the Act, “be subject to the
restrictions and obligations imposed by” the new Act.13
8. See United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984).
9. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 158 F.R.D. 211 (D.D.C. 1994), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1198
(D.C. Cir. 1995). The decree itself purported to settle a Clayton Act action to bar AT&T’s acquisition of
McCaw Cellular. See id. at 213 n.4. The AT&T-McCaw Decree had not yet been approved by the district
court when the Telecommunications Act of 1996 took effect.
10. See Settlement Agreement, Florida v. American Tobacco Co. (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 25, 1997) (No.
95-1466 AH), available at <http://stic.neu.edu/FL/flsettle.htm>; Comprehensive Settlement Agreement
and Release, Texas v. American Tobacco Co. (E.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 1998) (No. 5-96CV-91), available at
<http://stic.neu.edu/Tx/Texas-settlement.htm>; Memorandum of Understanding, In re Moore ex rel.
Mississippi Tobacco Litig.  (Chancery Ct. July 2, 1997) (No. 94-1429), available at
<http://stic.neu.edu/MS/mssettle.htm>; Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Consent
Judgment, Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 8, 1998) (No. C1-94-8565), available
at <http://stic.neu.edu/MN/settlement.htm>.
11. See Part XIII, Master Settlement Agreement, available at <http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/
Extra/multistate_settlement.htm> (requiring states with pending lawsuits against tobacco industry to enter
into consent decrees settling those suits); see also id. Exhibit L (model consent decree).
12. Section 3626(b)(2)-(3) of the PLRA states:
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the
immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a
finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right . . . [unless] the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief
remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn
and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3) (Supp. II 1996).
13. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(a)(1)-(3), 110 Stat. 56, 143 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152
(Supp. II 1996) (statutory and historical notes)).
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Given that the PLRA and the Telecommunications Act seem to be part of an
emerging trend—a trend likely to continue with national tobacco legislation—it
becomes important to know whether the constitutional constraints placed on
federal laws that supplant regulatory consent decrees differ from the constraints
placed on laws that do not. In other words, it is important to know if the
Constitution prohibits, or in any way limits, congressional efforts to “retake the
field” from the Judiciary.
The lower federal courts are grappling with this question right now. For a
time the circuit courts of appeals were split over whether section 3626(b)(2) of
the PLRA violates the separation of powers guarantee of the Constitution as an
impermissible legislative mandate to terminate final orders of the judicial
branch.14 The Ninth Circuit, the sole dissenting circuit, withdrew the decision of
its panel in United States v. Taylor15 that found section 3262(b)(2)
unconstitutional and scheduled the case for en banc review.16 If th  Ninth
Circuit affirms the panel’s decision and recreates a split of circuit authority, the
case might be a good candidate for Supreme Court review given the importance
of the issue to prison administration across the country. Even if the Ninth
Circuit ultimately agrees with the other circuit courts that section 3262(b)(2) is
constitutional, however, the varying rationales employed by the circuit courts
indicate that the federal courts are unable to agree on how to analyze this type of
legislation.
The federal courts have also had difficulty assessing the constitutionality of
the provisions of the Telecommunications Act that replaced the AT&T Consent
Decree with constraints that apply solely to the Bell operating companies.17 The
first court to confront the issue, the District Court for the Northern District of
14. Compare Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (PLRA termination
provision is consistent with separation of powers guarantee in Constitution), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2368
(1998), Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 2375 (1998), Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997) (same), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366 (1998), Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 2374 (1998), and Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2460 (1997), with Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 176 (2d Cir. 1997) (PLRA termination
provision is constitutional only if construed narrowly so that decree remains intact and can still be
enforced in state court), with Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.) (PLRA termination
provision improperly “reopen[s] the final judgments of the federal courts and unconditionally
extinguish[es] past consent decrees affecting prison conditions”), withdrawn, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir.
1998).
15. 143 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1998).
16. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, heard oral argument on January 21, 1999. A decision has yet
to be announced.
17. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-275 (Supp. II 1996).
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Texas, concluded that all five replacement provisions were unconstitutional.18
The Fifth Circuit reversed that decision, but did so over a vocal dissent.19 The
D.C. Circuit in separate decisions recently upheld the constitutionality of two of
the five provisions, those which bar the Bell operating companies from
providing certain long-distance services without prior governmental approval
and from providing electronic publishing services for four years.20 While that
court, like the Fifth Circuit, found those sections constitutional, it also did so
over a dissent (or, in the second of the two cases, a grudging concurrence).21
One of the D.C. Circuit decisions is still pending on writ of certiorari before the
Supreme Court.22 Even should the Supreme Court deny certiorari, the divergent
reasoning of the two courts of appeals bespeaks of a need for guidance.
This Article attempts to resolve some of this confusion by identifying the
provisions of the Constitution most likely implicated when Congress retakes a
field from judicial consent decrees and examines the constraints, if any, that
those provisions place upon such congressional action. As one might expect,
legislation that retakes a field necessarily performs two distinct functions: (i)
elimination or modification of the prior consent decrees and (ii) replacement of
those decrees with the new statutory provisions. With the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, for example, Congress eliminated the consent decrees that
governed most of the local telephone conglomerates23 and established the
statutory regime that would take their place.24 Which constitutional provisions
are implicated depends both upon which function is being performed and the
identity of the court that issued the decree.
When Congress performs the function of eliminating or modifying consent
decrees issued by federal courts, the primary constitutional issue, and by far the
most troubling, is one of separation of powers. A separation of powers issue
arises when “one branch [of the Federal Government]”—here, the Legislature—
18. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997), rev’d, 154 F.3d
226 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
19. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
889 (1999).
20. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding section 274 regarding
electronic publishing); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding section 271
regarding long-distance services).
21. See BellSouth, 144 F.3d at 71 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); BellSouth, 162 F.3d at 694 (Sentelle, J.,
concurring).
22. See BellSouth, 144 F.3d 58, petitions for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Dec. 28, 1998) (No.
98-1046), 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999) (No. 98-1153).
23. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(a), 110 Stat. 56, 143.
24. See id. §§ 251-261, 271-276, 110 Stat. at 61-79, 86-107.
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“invades the territory of another”—the Judiciary.25 But the possible infirmity
with such legislation is not limited to this issue because consent decrees are not
ordinary court orders. The terms of a consent decree, unlike the terms of a
traditional court order, reflect the agreement of the parties and are often beyond
the power of the court to impose without the parties’ consent.26 As a result,
consent decrees may be viewed as a hybrid of court order and contract.27 To the
extent they are viewed as a contract, congressional interference with such
decrees implicates those provisions of the Constitution that provide protection to
contractual interests—the Takings Clause,28 the Contracts Clause,29 and the
Due Process Clause.30
The elimination or modification of state court consent decrees raises many of
the same issues. As one would expect, the constitutional constraints on
interfering with the contractual aspects of a consent decree are largely the same
whether the decree is approved in state or federal court. The constitutional
constraints are not identical, however, because Congress stands in a different
relationship to state courts than it does to federal courts. Accordingly, federal
legislation that displaces state decrees implicates the constitutional provisions
dealing with state sovereignty—the Supremacy Clause31 and th  Tenth
25. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992). This is, as noted above, the issue that
had, for a time, engendered a split among the circuit courts with respect to the PLRA. See supra note 14
and accompanying text.
26. See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986) (“[I]t is the agreement of the
parties, rather than the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally based, that creates the
obligations embodied in a consent decree.”); see also id. at 525 (“a federal court is not necessarily barred
from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have
awarded after a trial”); Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making By Consent Decree: An Analysis of
Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 267 (“the boundaries of permissible
agreement between consenting parties [are] set by their legal authority to enter into the promises made, not
by the court’s authority to impose remedies after trial”).
27. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (noting that consent
decrees “in some respects [are] contractual in nature”); Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 519 (“[C]onsent decrees
‘have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees,’ a dual character that has resulted in different
treatment for different purposes.” (quoting United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223,
236 n.10 (1975))).
28. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
29. “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
30. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Amendment32—instead of those dealing with the allocation of power among the
branches of the Federal Government.
After eliminating or modifying the prior decrees, Congress turns to the
second function performed by retaking legislation and prescribes the federal
regulatory scheme that will supplant the decrees. Here it faces a different group
of potential constitutional roadblocks. Because these roadblocks pertain to the
replacement scheme and accordingly do not depend on which court’s decrees the
legislation displaces, this analysis applies equally to legislation that retakes the
field from either state or federal courts. In this context, the constitutional
roadblocks arise primarily because the new legislative scheme is likely to apply
to all relevant persons, whether or not they were previously parties to a decree.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, for instance, regulates all local and long-
distance telephone carriers, but the three consent decrees that had previously
regulated the industry only covered the largest carriers—AT&T, GTE, and the
Bell operating companies.33 Likewise, the Prison Litigation Reform Act applies
to any decree concerning the administration of any prison, although not every
prison was subject to such a decree when Congress passed the Act.34
Congress may, of course, choose to treat all persons the same under its new
regime, whether they were previously subject to a decree or not. For example,
under the PLRA, all prison decrees must be preceded by certain findings
whether they are newly instituted or have been on the books for years.35 But
Congress may choose to draw distinctions in its new legislative scheme on the
basis of whether certain persons or groups were previously subject to a decree.
Congress clearly did so in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 when it
subjected the Bell operating companies (and only them) to greater restrictions on
entering certain markets in part because those companies were the only ones
32. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
33. Compare 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-261 (Supp. II 1996) (provisions that apply to “telecommunications
carriers,” which are defined in section 153(44) as “any provider of telecommunications services” with one
exception not relevant here), with United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982)
(AT&T Consent Decree applies to AT&T and Bell operating companies), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984)
(GTE Consent Decree applies to GTE), and Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement,
United States v. AT&T (D.D.C.) (No. 94-01555), reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158 (1994) (AT&T-
McCaw Consent Decree applies to AT&T).
34. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (Supp. II 1996), with Costa, supra note 6, at 328-29 & nn.46-47
(observing that more than 30 states are subject to federally administered prison decrees).
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (requiring all new decrees to be preceded by certain findings); id.
§ 3626(b)(2) (requiring termination of prior decrees unless judge makes required findings).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/2
p53 Hoffstadt.doc 05/20/99   12:00 PM
1999] RETAKING THE FIELD 61
subject to the AT&T Consent Decree.36 In such a case, Congress implicates the
equal protection guarantee, which requires legislative distinctions to be
rational.37 Moreover, if the differently treated parties are burdened by the new
law, it also implicates the Bill of Attainder Clause, which prohibits Congress
from punishing specified persons.38
This Article examines how each of these constitutional provisions, as
interpreted in the Supreme Court’s leading precedent, affects Congress’s ability
to retake the field. This Article concludes that these provisions place only
modest limits on such legislation. Part I focuses on the provisions implicated
when Congress eliminates or modifies the regulatory consent decrees of federal
courts—the separation of powers guarantee, the Takings Clause, the Contracts
Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Part II examines the Supremacy Clause
and Tenth Amendment issues that potentially circumscribe congressional efforts
to displace the decrees of state courts. Part III discusses the Equal Protection
and Bill of Attainder Clause concerns that define the degree of latitude Congress
enjoys when crafting its new regulatory scheme.
I. THE ELIMINATION AND MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL CONSENT DECREES
As discussed above, when Congress attempts to retake a field already
occupied by consent decrees issued by federal courts, its actions potentially
implicate a number of constitutional guarantees—the separation of powers
guarantee, the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Due Process
Clause. Each of these provisions, as well as the limitations they place upon the
ability of Congress to alter federal consent decrees, is discussed separately
below.
A. Separation of Powers
The first three Articles of the Constitution apportion the various functions of
the Federal Government among three branches—the legislative, executive, and
36. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-276 (placing limits on Bell’s entry into long-distance and equipment
manufacturing markets); see also AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 226-34 (AT&T Consent Decree doing same).
37. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to
the states but has been incorporated through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to apply to the
Federal Government as well. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995) (noting
that Court “treat[s] the equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments
as indistinguishable”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
38. “No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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judicial.39 Although the Constitution expressly enumerates the core “Powers” of
each branch, it does not devote much attention to delineating the limits of each
power.40 To ensure that each branch stays within its boundaries, the courts have
inferred from the structure of the Constitution an independent “separation of
powers” guarantee.41 The courts have not interpreted the Constitution to require
a hermetic separation among the branches.42 Instead, they have defined the
separation of powers limitation narrowly so as only to “guard against
‘encroachment or aggrandizement’ by [one branch] at the expense of the other
branches of government.”43
Even with this narrow focus, the line between permissible interaction and
impermissible encroachment is difficult to draw, particularly between the
legislative and judicial branches. Ever since Marbury v. Madison,44 it h s been
“the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”45 The
judicial branch, as the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, has a monopoly on
saying what the constitutional law is.46 But the judicial branch shares with
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I (describing “All legislative Powers”); U.S. CONST. art. II (describing
“[t]he executive Power”); U.S. CONST. art. III (describing “[t]he judicial Power”).
40. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8 (enumerating 17 specific legislative powers and granting more
general power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States
or in any Department or Officer thereof”); U.S. CONST. art. II (enumerating specific Powers belonging to
President but also granting more general power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”); U.S.
CONST. art. III (enumerating cases over which Supreme Court has jurisdiction but also vesting “judicial
Power of the United States” in Supreme Court). Indeed, even the limitations explicitly placed on the
legislative branch are difficult to interpret. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend IX (“The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”);
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
41. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983) (“The very structure of the Articles delegating
and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplifies the concept of separation of powers . . . .”).
42. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (“In designing the structure of our
Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers
of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended
to operate with absolute independence.”); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
443 (1977) (noting that “the Court [had] squarely rejected the argument that the Constitution
contemplates a complete division of authority between the three branches”).
43. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)); see also New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“The Constitution’s division of power among the three branches is violated
where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves
the encroachment.”); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963 (Powell, J., concurring) (“the doctrine may be violated
when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another”).
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. Id. at 177.
46. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-64 (1997). For a further discussion of this
point, see infra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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Congress the power of saying what the statutory law is because Congress under
Article I may enact, amend, and repeal the very statutes that the courts under
Article III may interpret.47 Given this overlap, there are many instances when
Congress, in the exercise of its power, can affect the outcome of cases before
the Judiciary without exceeding its legislative power as set out in Article I.48 But
that power is not plenary, and the Supreme Court has not hesitated to say when
“Congress has . . . passed the limit which separates the legislative from the
judicial power.”49 The Court has evolved a complex body of precedent
delineating this “limit”—that is, the circumstances under which Congress may
alter statutory law that affects cases moving through the judicial branch. This
limit varies depending on whether the affected cases are still being litigated or
have been finally resolved by the Judiciary.50 Thus, the precedent governing
each scenario is discussed separately below.
1. Pending Cases
Under the Court’s separation of powers precedent, Congress may in certain
circumstances exercise its Article I authority to legislate even when by doing so
it intends to alter the outcome of cases that are still pending in the federal court
system. More specifically, Congress may enact legislation that either (i)
withdraws or modifies the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the case or (ii)
changes the statutory law the courts are relying upon to resolve the pending
case.
Congress’s authority to influence the outcome of pending cases by redefining
the jurisdiction of the federal courts hearing them is derived from Article III
itself. Article III enumerates the cases over which the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction and some of the cases over which it has appellate
jurisdiction but otherwise leaves it to Congress to expand the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction and to create, and define the jurisdiction of, the lower
47. “It is undoubtedly true that, in our system of government, the law-making power is vested in
Congress, and the power to construe laws in the course of their administration between citizens, in the
courts.” Stockdale v. Insurance Cos., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323, 332 (1873).
48. See Maine Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 813 F.2d 484, 492
(1st Cir. 1987) (observing that “the distinction between legislative and adjudicative purposes and effects
can be illusory”).
49. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871).
50. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (“a distinction between
judgments from which all appeals have been forgone or completed, and judgments that remain on appeal
(or subject to being appealed), is implicit in what Article III creates”).
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federal courts.51 Consistent with this grant of authority, the Supreme Court has
upheld federal legislation that affected the outcome of cases pending in the
federal trial52 and appellate courts53 by altering the jurisdiction of those courts.
In most circumstances, Congress may also affect the outcome of a case
pending before the trial or appellate courts by amending the federal statutory
law underlying that case.54 To do so, Congress need only make clear its intent
that the amended law apply to pending cases, so as to overcome the usual
presumption that new laws apply solely on a prospective basis.55 Th s power is
confined to amendments to statutory law; Congress does not have the authority
to amend constitutional law, as the Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores56 oundly reaffirms. In that case, the Court examined the
51. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.” (emphasis added)); see also Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (“All federal
courts, other than the Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise of the authority to
‘ordain and establish’ inferior courts, conferred on Congress by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution.”);
Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (“There can be no question of the power of
Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.”).
52. See, e.g., Norris v. Crocker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 429 (1851) (holding that Congress’s repeal of
1793 act bars action under that act pending at time of its repeal).
53. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (dismissing habeas petition on
ground that Congress’s repeal of Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over such petitions required
dismissal, even though petition was pending before Court at time Congress acted); Bruner v. United
States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952) (dismissing appeal of case in light of legislation that withdrew district court
jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims, even though appeal was pending when Congress acted); Insurance
Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 541, 544 (1866) (dismissing suit when act upon which federal court’s
jurisdiction was based was repealed and replaced by act that expressly denied federal jurisdiction).
54. See Ira Bloom, Prisons, Prisoners, and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall Separating
Legislative from Judicial Power, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 400 (1998) (“During the pendency of an appeal,
Congress may alter the law, and the higher court is bound by the change in the law.”); see also infra note
55.
55. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Prior to Landgraf, there was no
consistent approach to when a new law would be applied to pending cases. One line of cases, culminating
in Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974), demanded that the court apply the new
law to pending cases on the ground that it was the obligation of the Judiciary to apply the law in effect at
the time of decision. See also Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (dismissing petitioner’s challenge to
Colorado voting requirement after Colorado changed its law, reasoning that “[w]e review the judgment
below in light of the Colorado statute as it now stands, not as it once did”); American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921) (applying Clayton Act standard for propriety of
injunctive relief in labor dispute, even though Act became effective after initial suit was on appeal).
A second line of cases, culminating in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204
(1988), insisted that the new law not apply to pending cases because such retroactivity is not to be favored
in the law. Landgraf harmonized these two lines of cases by adopting a rebuttable presumption in favor of
purely prospective application of a new law that could be overcome by a showing of clear congressional
intent to apply the law to pending cases. See 511 U.S. at 280.
56. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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constitutionality of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (“RFRA”),57
which it understood as a congressional attempt to redefine the protection
afforded by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. “When the Court has
interpreted the Constitution,” it observed, “[the Court] has acted within the
province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law
is.”58 Congress, by enacting RFRA, attempted to exercise the inherently judicial
power of revising prior judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision. The
Court accordingly concluded that the Legislature had encroached upon the
exclusive domain of the Judiciary and thereby violated the separation of powers
guarantee.59
Notwithstanding the precedent allowing Congress to modify the courts’
subject matter jurisdiction or to amend statutory law, Congress’s power to
influence the outcome of pending cases is not without limits. In United States v.
Klein,60 the Supreme Court for the first time held, with respect to pending cases,
that Congress may not make any withdrawal of jurisdiction dependent “solely
on the application of a rule of decision.”61
Klein involved an executor’s attempt to recover from the United States the
value of property that the Government had confiscated from the decedent during
the Civil War. Klein, the executor, had brought suit in the Court of Claims
under an 1863 Act that entitled persons to recover the proceeds of confiscated
property “on proof . . . that [the plaintiff] has never given any aid or comfort to
the present rebellion.”62 Before his death, the decedent took advantage of a
Presidential proclamation, made pursuant to an 1862 Act of Congress, that
pardoned any person who had previously aided the rebellion if he took an oath
of allegiance to the Union.63 O  the basis of the decedent’s pardon, the Court of
Claims awarded the decedent’s estate $125,300 under the 1863 Act.64
While Klein’s case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Padelford,65 which upheld an award of property to a claimant holding a
pardon issued pursuant to a Presidential proclamation. In direct response to
Padelford, Congress in 1870 enacted legislation declaring such pardons to be
57. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
(1994)).
58. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
59. See id.
60. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
61. Id. at 146.
62. Id. at 131 (emphasis omitted).
63. See id. at 131-32.
64. See id. at 132.
65. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
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“conclusive evidence that such person did take part in, and give aid and comfort
to, the late rebellion” such that the Supreme Court would be without jurisdiction
to hear any appeals based on such evidence.66
When the Government moved for dismissal of Klein’s case in light of the
new legislation, Klein argued that the 1870 Act was unconstitutional and
prevailed. The Supreme Court acknowledged that Article I granted Congress the
power to modify the jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the nonconstitutional
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but concluded that Congress did not
actually exercise that power in the 1870 Act. To be sure, the Act withdrew the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. But it did so conditionally. Under the Act, the
Court observed, “The [federal] court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given
point; but when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists [that is, the
plaintiff has a pardon], its jurisdiction is to cease and it is required to dismiss for
cause for want of jurisdiction.”67 Thus, Congress, through the use of its power
of jurisdiction, effectively dictated to the courts how they were to resolve a
subset of pending cases: if those cases involve a Presidential pardon (that is, if
the Government was going to lose under Padelford), they were to be dismissed.
The Court found that such a law, which it characterized as tying “the denial of
jurisdiction” to “the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending,
prescribed by Congress,” “passed the limit which separates the legislative from
the judicial power.”68
Unfortunately, the Court’s articulation of Klein’s prohibition is less than
crystal clear and accordingly has spawned numerous interpretations.69 On the
one hand, it is possible to limit this language to the situation present in Klein
itself—that is, Congress may not make a court’s continued jurisdiction
contingent upon the court’s conclusion that a particular party will prevail (in
Klein’s case, the Government). At the other extreme, it is possible to read Klein
as standing for the much broader proposition that Congress may not ever, either
by modifying jurisdiction or amending statutory law, dictate the outcome of any
pending case.70 Proponents of this latter view often point to a passage in Klein
66. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 134 (quoting 16 Stat. 235 (1870)).
67. Id. at 146.
68. Id. at 146, 147.
69. It is fairly clear, however, that the term “rule of decision” used in Klein is not necessarily the
same as the term “rules of decision” used in the Court’s subsequent decision in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (interpreting federal courts’ power to make federal common law). In Klein
the term appears to refer to both substantive and procedural law; in Erie the term appears to refer to the
substantive rules of law.
70. See Bloom, supra note 54, at 404 (citing United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S.
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in which the Court seems to find fault with the act of “prescrib[ing] a rule for
the decision of a cause in a particular way.”71 They also point to the Court’s
subsequent decision in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians.72 In Sioux
Nation, the Court upheld a federal law that gave the Sioux a forum for a
constitutional claim that had already been rejected by the courts on res judicata
grounds because, unlike in Klein, “Congress made no effort . . . to control the
Court of Claims’ ultimate decision of that claim.”73 Proponents regard this
passage in Sioux Nation as indicating the Court’s agreement with their view that
Klein prohibits legislative efforts to direct the outcome of pending cases.
Analysis of the Court’s precedent reveals, however, that the Court has
rejected this broader view and all but limited Klein to its facts. It is, for instance,
quite clear that Congress may eliminate the jurisdiction underlying pending
cases, even when doing so effectively directs a result in favor of one party,
including the Government. In Ex parte McCardle,74 a pre-Klein opinion that
continues to be cited as good law today, the Court upheld legislation that
eliminated the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petitions, including petitions pending on appeal.75 Similarly, in Bruner v. United
States,76 the Court sustained federal legislation that withdrew jurisdiction over
Tucker Act claims from the district courts because “when a law conferring
jurisdiciton is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all cases fall
with the law.”77 The Court referred to this rule as one that “has been adhered to
consistently by this Court.”78 In both cases, the Court upheld the legislation at
371, 404 (1980), for the proposition that “[Klein] proposed a rule of decision in a case pending before the
courts, and did so in a manner that required the courts to decide a controversy in the Government’s
favor”); see also Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 405 (finding no violation of Klein because “Congress made
no effort . . . to control the Court of Claims’ ultimate decision on [a] claim”); Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d
940, 943 (6th Cir.) (The PLRA does not “prescribe[] a rule of decision” because the PLRA’s termination
provision “only prescribes the standard for authorizing a remedy in any given case. It does not dictate the
result a court must reach in determining whether relief is warranted.”), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2368
(1998); James v. Lash, 965 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (finding that PLRA does not violate
Klein because it “does not mandate a specific result”).
71. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
72. 448 U.S. 371, 407 (1980).
73. Id. at 405.
74. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
75. Although McCardle was decided two years before Klein, the Court in Klein did not purport to
overrule McCardle and a number of post-Klein cases continue to cite McCardle as good law. See, e.g.,
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 567-68 (1962); De La Rama S.S. Co. v. United States, 344 U.S.
386, 390 (1953).
76. 343 U.S. 112 (1951).
77. Id. at 116-17.
78. Id. at 116 & n.8 (collecting cases); see also Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506 (1916)
(dismissing from federal court suit for equitable title on Indian land in light of congressional withdrawal of
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issue even though it had the effect of directing a verdict in the Government’s
favor. Thus, Klein has not been understood to preclude the simple withdrawal
of jurisdiction, whether that withdrawal changes the plaintiff’s tribunal (as in
Bruner) or, because no tribunal remains, eliminates a substantive right (as in
McCardle).
This result is not particularly surprising, as the Court in Klein did not
purport to alter the longstanding rule that “the legislature has complete control
over the organization and existence of [a federal] court and may confer or
withhold the right of appeal from its decisions.”79 Thus, Congress could have
mandated dismissal of Klein’s case without violating the separation of powers
guarantee had it simply repealed the district court’s jurisdiction over all cases
arising under the 1863 Act. Had Congress done so, its actions would have been
sustained under McCardle and Bruner.
It is equally clear, moreover, that Congress may amend the statutory law
that underlies pending cases and thereby affect the outcome of those cases. In
United States v. Schooner Peggy,80 the Court upheld federal legislation that
required the Government to return property it had captured but not yet legally
condemned as applied to a suit still pending on appeal.81 Congress had amended
the law of condemnation, and the Court sustained the amendment. Under this
reasoning, Congress would have encountered no constitutional obstacles in
Klein had it repealed the 1863 Act altogether because doing so would have
effected a change in the law. Indeed, the Court’s more recent precedent has
frankly acknowledged this and now more explicitly provides that Klein’s
“prohibition does not take hold when Congress ‘amend[s] applicable law.’”82
Had Congress repealed the 1863 Act and specified that the repeal would apply
to pending cases, the Supreme Court would have been forced to recognize the
repeal in Klein and to enter judgment for the Government.83
jurisdiction over such cases).
79. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
80. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
81. See id. at 107, 110. Schooner Peggy was recently reaffirmed in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994).
82. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (quoting Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992)); see also Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 372 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2460 (1997) (“While the Court has never determined the precise scope of
Klein, at the very least it is clear that Congress does not mandate a rule of decision when it amends the law
underlying a pending case.”); Kristin L. Burns, Note, Return to Hard Time: The Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 31 GA. L. REV. 879, 900 (1997) (“In United States v. Klein, the Supreme Court
held that Congress may not prescribe a rule of decision in cases pending before the federal judiciary,
except when Congress amends the law underlying the particular case.”).
83. Thus, the argument that Klein is violated if a statutory amendment dictates a result in the
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Indeed, Klein also does not bar Congress from altering the facts underlying a
pending lawsuit even when doing so will change its outcome. In The Clinton
Bridge,84 the Supreme Court dismissed an action for injunctive relief to have a
bridge over the Mississippi River torn down as a public nuisance. While the suit
was awaiting trial, Congress passed an act declaring the bridge to be “a lawful
structure, and . . . recognized and known as a post route.”85 The Court had little
difficulty concluding that Congress’s modification of the quasi-factual issue of
whether the bridge was a public nuisance was permissible notwithstanding the
fact that it “gave the rule of decision for the court.”86
In light of this subsequent precedent, Klein effectively has been limited to
congressional efforts to dictate the outcome of pending cases through the
conditional withdrawal of jurisdiction. This reading is not only consistent with
Klein itself, it is also consistent with Sioux Nation, which proponents of the
broader view tout as their main support. To be sure, the Court in Sioux Nation
distinguished the legislation it was reviewing from the legislation in Klein on the
ground that the law before it only required a new hearing and did not purport to
“control the . . . ultimate decision of that claim.”87 But to say that the legislation
in Sioux Nation did not dictate the outcome is not the same as holding that any
law that does is, for that reason alone, constitutionally infirm. After all, no one
would read a statement by the Court that a particular law does not implicate
religion as a holding that all laws implicating religion are unconstitutional.
The narrowness of Klein’s limitation makes sense. The separation of powers
guarantee ensures that one branch of the Federal Government does not invade
another’s domain.88 Klein could not bar Congress from changing the law or
facts underlying a pending case: The courts have no interest in which statutory
law they apply or in who prevails. The courts do, however, have an interest in
preserving the integrity of their own decision-making process. That integrity is
Government’s favor is inconsistent with the Court’s precedent.
84. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454 (1870).
85. Id. at 462.
86. Id. at 463. Although Clinton Bridge was decided a year before Klein, Klein preserved its
validity. The Court in Klein went out of its way to distinguish the act at issue in Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855), from the act at issue in Klein. The
Court in Klein stated, “No arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in [Wheeling], but the Court was left
to apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances created by the act.” Klein, 80 U.S. at 146-47
(emphasis added). By preserving Wheeling, the Court in effect preserved Clinton Bridge as well because
Clinton Bridge rested on the “same principle” as Wheeling. See Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at
463.
87. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 405 (1980).
88. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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compromised when Congress converts the rules governing jurisdiction, which
ostensibly have little to do with the substantive outcome of a case, into tools for
dictating particular substantive outcomes. Allowing such sleight of hand leaves
Congress less accountable for changes in the law because it permits Congress to
influence the outcome of pending cases by tampering with jurisdictional rules
instead of facing the political fallout that might accompany amendment of the
underlying statutory law.89
Congress has a great deal of latitude in enacting legislation that affects cases
pending in the federal courts. As the above discussion illustrates, it may
influence the outcome of those cases without violating the separation of powers
guarantee either by altering the courts’ jurisdiction or by amending the
underlying substantive law. It must only refrain from dictating the result in
pending cases through conditional withdrawal of subject matter jurisdiction.
2. “Final” Cases
Congress’s power to influence cases that have been finally decided by the
judicial branch depends on the type of relief awarded when the case was
resolved.90 As discussed below, cases in which a court has awarded damages or
declaratory relief have, for most intents and purposes, passed beyond the
constitutional power of Congress to influence. But when a case results in the
award of ongoing prospective relief—injunctions or consent decrees—it
resembles a pending case and Congress retains some ability to influence the
continued validity of the prospective relief.
a. Cases Where No Prospective Relief Is Awarded
As the Court recently made clear in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,91
Congress has almost no authority to enact legislation that affects cases that have
been finally resolved by the courts and have not resulted in the issuance of any
89. At least one member of the Court has found congressional accountability to be a relevant
concern in the separation of powers analysis. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (discussing how need for
congressional accountability precludes Congress from commandeering state legislatures under Tenth
Amendment).
90. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that Plaut drew a
line between “final judgments without prospective effect . . . and final judgments with prospective
effects”).
91. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
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prospective relief.92 In Plaut, Congress had amended the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 to extend the statute of limitations for section 10(b)
actions; the amendment also ordered the reinstatement of any section 10(b)
actions that had been dismissed as untimely under the prior limitations period if
those actions would have been timely under the new limitations period.93 This
amendment, the Court noted, had the effect of “‘revers[ing] a determination
once made, in a particular case.’”94 The Court found that a law with this effect
implicated the separation of powers guarantee because the Constitution “gives
the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them,
subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy—with an
understanding, in short, that ‘a judgment conclusively resolves the case’ because
‘a “judicial Power” is one to render dispositive judgments.’”95 “By retroactively
commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments,” Congress
encroached upon the judicial power and violated the separation of powers
guarantee.96
The Court has recognized what amounts to a very narrow exception to this
otherwise absolute rule. In a line of cases that started with Cherokee Nation v.
United States,97 the Court has held that Congress may create new causes of
action for damages against the United States, even when doing so effectively
92. Of course, Congress remains free to “overrule” a federal court decision by statute when the new
provision has a purely prospective effect. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981)
(concluding that federal law regarding designation of beneficiary for nondisability, military retirement pay
preempts state community property law), superseded by 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1994). But only the
courts may overrule their prior decisions interpreting the Constitution. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117
S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
93. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214-15.
94. Id. at 225 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.,
1961)); see also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855)
(accepting “as a general proposition” argument that “act of congress cannot have the effect and operation
to annul the judgment of the court already rendered”).
95. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218-19 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990)).
96. Id. at 219. The Executive is also prohibited from tampering with final judgments.
Judicial jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a cause, and inasmuch as the Constitution
does not contemplate that there shall be more than one Supreme Court, it is quite clear that Congress
cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme Court to the re-examination and revision of any other
tribunal or any other department of the government.
United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647-48 (1874) (holding that Secretary of the Treasury
could not revise court’s judgment); see also Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (taking case
under advisement and noting that lower court had urged repeal of law which allowed Secretary of War, an
executive branch official, to review pension determinations made by district courts; Court never ruled on
this issue because Congress repealed law while case was under advisement); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 225-26
(collecting cases).
97. 270 U.S. 476 (1926).
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reopens a prior judicial judgment that the United States is not liable for a
particular debt. In Cherokee Nation, the Court sustained a 1919 Act of
Congress that required the Court of Claims to examine whether the Cherokee
Nation was entitled to compound interest on a longstanding debt, even though
the issue “would have been foreclosed as res judicata” by a prior judgment of
the Court of Claims awarding simple interest to the Cherokee Nation.98 The
Court saw no impediment to allowing Congress to waive the defense of res
judicata, particularly when the precise issue of compound interest had not been
raised in the previous action.99
The Court extended the Cherokee Nation “new obligation” rule slightly in
subsequent cases by allowing Congress to create new causes of action as to
claims previously considered and rejected by courts. In Pope v. United States,100
Congress had passed a Special Act requiring the Court of Claims to hear Pope’s
claims for services rendered in building a tunnel to transport water into
Washington, D.C., notwithstanding a prior Court of Claims judgment denying
Pope payment for this work.101 The Court refused to “construe the Special Act
as requiring the Court of Claims to set aside the judgment in a case already
decided.”102 Instead, the Court viewed the Act as “creat[ing] a new obligation of
the Government to pay petitioner’s claims where no obligation existed
before,”103 which the Court felt was squarely within Congress’s power under the
Debt Clause of the Constitution.104 The Court relied upon identical reasoning in
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,105 where it sustained a law ordering
the Court of Claims to examine whether the Government’s breach of a treaty
with the Sioux violated the Takings Clause, even though a prior judgment of
that court had dismissed the same Takings claim on jurisdictional grounds. As
in Pope, the Court found Congress’s actions “consistent with a substantial body
of precedent affirming the broad constitutional power of Congress to define and
‘to pay the Debts . . . of the United States.’”106
98. Id. at 486. Although the Court of Claims is not an Article III court, the Supreme Court has
deemed this distinction irrelevant for separation of powers purposes. See United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 405 n.25 (1980).
99. See Cherokee Nation, 270 U.S. at 486.
100. 323 U.S. 1 (1944).
101. See id. at 3-4.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id.
104. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the
Debts . . . of the United States . . . .”).
105. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
106. Id. at 397 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
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The Court has refused to extend this particular line of precedent to situations
not involving Congress’s exercise of its power under the Debt Clause. Most
recently, the Court in Plaut rejected the Government’s attempt to analogize
section 27A(b) of the Securities Act, which required the federal courts to
reinstate section 10(b) actions previously dismissed as untimely, to the Act
upheld in Sioux Nation.107 Although both statutes achieved the same result—the
reopening of final judgments—the Court refused to extend Sioux Nation.
Instead, the Court stated “our holding [in Sioux Nation] was as narrow as the
precedent on which we had relied” and applied only when Congress “‘mere[ly]
waiv[ed] . . . the res judicata effect of a prior judicial decision rejecting the
validity of a legal claim against the United States.’”108 This result seems correct
as a matter of separation of powers precedent, for the statutes in Cherokee
Nation, Pope, and Sioux Nation effectively reopened final judgments. These
statutes thus performed a function that, absent an express and overriding
constitutional grant such as the Debt Clause, belongs exclusively to the judicial
branch.109
b. Cases Where Prospective Relief Is Awarded
Although cases in which prospective relief is awarded are “final” insofar as
they are no longer subject to appeal,110 th  Supreme Court has found that
Congress still has the authority to influence these cases. The extent of
Congress’s authority may, however, depend upon the type of prospective relief
awarded.
i. Injunctive Relief
Since before the Civil War, the Court has consistently recognized that
injunctions based on federal law are subject to modification—and, indeed, must
be modified—when Congress changes that law. The seminal case for this
107. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230-31 (1995).
108. Id. at 230 (quoting Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 407).
109. Some members of the Court would not recognize any exception to the general rule against
tampering with final judgments. See, e.g., Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 427 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(urging Court to acknowledge that “Congress [had] reviewed the decisions of the Court of Claims, set
aside the judgment that no taking of the Black Hills occurred, set aside the judgment that there is no
cognizable reason for relitigating this claim, and ordered a new trial”).
110. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 391 (1992) (noting that “consent
decree is a final judgment”).
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proposition is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.111 Th
Wheeling case actually reached the Supreme Court twice. In its first
appearance, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court judgment that issued an
injunction ordering Wheeling to remove or elevate a bridge it had erected over
the Ohio River because the bridge was too low for passing ships and thus
constituted a public nuisance.112 When, in 1854, Wheeling rebuilt the same
bridge after it was destroyed in a summer storm, the State of Pennsylvania
sought to have Wheeling held in contempt of court. In its second appearance
before the Supreme Court, Wheeling argued that the injunction could no longer
be enforced in light of an 1852 Act of Congress. The 1852 Act declared “the
bridges across the Ohio River at Wheeling . . . to be lawful structures in their
present positions and elevations” and designated such bridges “post-roads for
the passage of the mails of the United States.”113The Court held that the 1852
law could not upset its earlier judgment awarding costs to the State of
Pennsylvania114 but reached a different holding with respect to the injunctive
portion of its earlier judgment:
But that part of the decree, directing the abatement of the obstruction, is
executory, a continuing decree, which requires not only the removal of
the bridge, but enjoins the defendants against any reconstruction or
continuance. Now, whether it is a future existing or continuing
obstruction depends upon the question whether or not it interferes with
the right of navigation. If, in the mean time, since the decree, this right
has been modified by the competent authority, so that the bridge is no
longer an unlawful obstruction, it is quite plain the decree of the court
cannot be enforced.115
The High Court has not rejected Wheeling in the intervening 150 years and
has recently followed its logic in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.116
There, the Seattle and Portland Audubon Societies each brought suit in district
court to enjoin proposed timber sales they claimed would harm the northern
spotted owl in violation of a number of federal statutes.117 In both cases, the
111. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
112. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 578 (1851).
113. Wheeling, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 429.
114. See id. at 431.
115. Id. at 431-32.
116. 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
117. See id. at 432-33.
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lower court enjoined certain timber sales.118 “In response to this ongoing
litigation,” Congress enacted the Northwest Timber Compromise.119 The
Compromise established certain harvesting requirements for the forests at issue
in those cases.120 The Compromise also declared that compliance with its
provisions was “adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory
requirements that are the basis for the [two outstanding cases].”121 A unanimous
Court concluded that the Compromise effected a change in the five statutes at
issue in the cases by creating a temporary alternative means of complying with
them.122 The enjoined parties were therefore entitled to dismissal of the
injunctions as long as they followed the schedule of harvesting set out in the new
statutory law.123
A few lower courts and commentators have read these cases narrowly,
seizing on language in Wheeling as well as a handful of other cases not
involving injunctive relief to support the argument that Congress may only
modify the law underlying final injunctive relief when that law involves “public
right[s] secured by acts of congress.”124 In Wheeling, the Court distinguished
the “private right to damages,” which it found beyond the power of Congress to
amend, from the “public right of the free navigation of the river,” which it found
118. See id.
119. Id. at 433. The act was officially called Section 318 of the Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, sec. 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745 (1989).
120. See id. at 433-34 & n.1 (describing and selectively quoting provisions of Compromise).
121. Id. at 435 (quoting Appropriations Act, sec. 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747).
122. See id. at 438.
123. See id. at 438 (“[The] operation [of the Compromise], we think, modified the old provisions.”).
Congress enacted a similar statute affecting timber sales five years later. See Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for
Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194 (1995) (“Rescissions Act”). The Rescissions Act took a slightly broader
approach than the Northwest Timber Compromise because the Rescissions Act did not amend only the
particular statutes underlying certain outstanding lawsuits. Instead, it provided that “[t]he Secretary
concerned may conduct salvage timber sales under subsection (b) notwithstanding any decision,
restraining order, or injunction issued by a United States court before the date of the enactment of this
section.” Id. § 2001(c)(9), 109 Stat. at 244 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1611 (Supp. II 1996)) (emphases
added).
124. Wheeling, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431; see also Costa, supra note 6, at 355-59 (arguing that “the
nature of the rights [public or private] involved is essential in determining the scope” of separation of
powers doctrine).
The federal courts assessing the constitutionality of the Prison Litigation Reform Act are split on
whether the distinction between public and private rights is a valid one. Compare Benjamin v. Jacobson,
124 F.3d 162, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting in dicta that distinction may be valid), with Gavin v.
Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1088 (8th Cir. 1997) (“character of the right involved has nothing to do with
the separation of powers issue”), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2374 (1998), and Jensen v. County of Lake,
958 F. Supp. 397, 403 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (rejecting distinction).
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to be “under the regulation of congress.”125 The Court seemed to draw a similar
distinction between public and private rights in Stockdale v. Insurance Cos.126
by sustaining a law imposing tax liability for prior years in part because that
law did not “interfere with or invade personal rights which were beyond the
constitutional power of Congress.”127 The Court referred to the dichotomy of
public and private rights once more in Hodges v. Snyder,128 where it held that a
state legislature did not violate due process when it passed a law declaring a
particular school district to be lawful after the state supreme court had enjoined
the district as unlawful. The Court stated:
It is true that . . . the private rights of parties which have been vested by
the judgment of a court cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation,
but must be thereafter enforced by the court regardless of such
legislation.
This rule, however, as held in the Wheeling Bridge Case, does not
apply to a suit brought for the enforcement of a public right . . . .129
Upon further analysis, however, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court
has not embraced the notion that Congress’s ability to alter statutory law and
consequently affect the continuing validity of injunctive relief hinges on whether
the rights involved are public or private. The Court has time and again declined
to confine Wheeling to cases involving congressional modification of public
rights. For example, in System Federation No. 91 v. Wright,130 the Court
upheld the modification of a consent decree that had settled a labor dispute
between private parties when Congress amended the underlying labor law. Nor
did the Court in Robertson find any infirmity with the Northwest Timber
Compromise, which effectively ended disputes between private parties regarding
the propriety of certain timber sales.131 In fact, the Court’s most recent
pronouncement on when consent decrees must be modified, Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail,132 makes no attempt to confine its rule that decrees must be
modified in response to a “significant change . . . in law” to the law affecting
125. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431.
126. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323 (1873).
127. Id. at 333.
128. 261 U.S. 600 (1922).
129. Id. at 603 (citations omitted).
130. 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
131. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992); see also supra notes 116-23 and
accompanying text.
132. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
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public rights.133
Even the precedent cited in favor of this distinction does not support it. In
both Wheeling and Stockdale, as in Wright and Robertson, the Court’s primary
concern was whether Congress had the authority over the subject matter it was
attempting to regulate. Thus in Wheeling, the Court found Congress’s
legislative approval of the bridge constitutional because the “public right of the
free navigation of the river” was “under the regulation of congress.”134 In that
same vein, the Court found no impediment to amendment of the tax laws in
Stockdale because Congress did not attempt to “interfere with or invade
personal rights which were beyond the constitutional power of Congress.”135
Given that the Court’s focus has been on Congress’s authority, the distinction
between public and private rights would seem to be relevant only if it were a
reliable proxy for whether the law affecting such rights is within Congress’s
enumerated powers—that is, if all laws affecting private rights were beyond
Congress’s power while all laws affecting public rights were within its
authority. In light of Wright and Robertson, where the Court sustained
modifications to laws (and therefore judgments) affecting private rights, it is
difficult to conclude that one is a proxy for the other.
To be sure, the Court in Hodges seemed to articulate a more rigid dichotomy
between legislation that amended the law affecting public versus private
rights.136 But Hodges was not a separation of powers case—it was a due
process case involving the power of a state legislature to modify an injunction
issued by a state court. For that reason alone, Hodges must be approached with
caution as a separation of powers precedent. Nevertheless, the Court in Hodges
purported to draw its distinction between public and private rights from
Wheeling, a separation of powers case.137 The distinction drawn in Wheeling,
however, was, as noted above, based on the power of Congress to affect the
judgments in that case: Congress could enact legislation affecting the judgment
regarding the legality of the bridge because of its power over free navigation of
the Nation’s rivers; it could not touch the judgment of costs because that
133. Id. at 384; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986)
(“this Court has rejected any attempt to make determinative for Article III purposes the distinction
between public rights and private rights”).
134. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855).
135. Stockdale v. Insurance Cos., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323, 333 (1873); see also id. at 332 (“And it
may be conceded that Congress cannot . . . invade private rights, with which it could not interfere by a
new or affirmative statute.” (emphasis added)).
136. Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603-04 (1923).
137. See id.
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judgment was final. Even assuming that Hodges can be translated to the
separation of powers context and that the distinction it draws is a cognizable
one, Hodges’ language condemning legislation that modifies prospective relief
affecting private rights was ultimately dicta, for Hodges involved public rights.
When the Court finally confronted legislation that sought to modify a final
judgment of injunctive relief in a case involving private rights, as it did in
Wright, the Court sanctioned the modification. Thus, Hodges would not seem to
qualify Wheeling.138
ii. Consent Decrees
Consent decrees are not injunctions, however. Although they are similar to
injunctions in that they “bear some of the earmarks of judgments entered after
litigation[,] . . . because their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement of
the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble contracts.”139 Because the
terms of consent decrees are agreed upon by the parties, they can and often do
afford relief beyond that which a court could have imposed on its own after
trial.140 The question is whether the hybrid nature of consent decrees—part
contract and part judgment—requires a different rule from that governing
injunctions as to whether Congress, by amending federal law, can require
modification of a consent decree.
Both precedent and the policy underlying the separation of powers guarantee
indicate that the rule should be the same for both injunctions and consent
decrees.141 A change in the applicable statutory law should, upon a party’s
request, require modification of a consent decree, as it does with an
138. For a discussion of the extent to which these due process concerns are relevant to the inquiry into
the propriety of congressional interference with consent decrees, see infra Part I.B.3.
139. Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986); see also id. (“The question is not
whether we can label a consent decree as a ‘contract’ or a ‘judgment,’ for we can do both.”).
140. See id. at 525. In Local No. 93, for example, the Court upheld a consent decree that included
class-wide quotas for the promotion of minorities within the City of Cleveland’s Fire Department even
though the Civil Rights Act upon which it was based did not permit remedies to be awarded to those who
had not personally suffered discrimination. See id. at 514-15.
141. At least one scholar disagrees. In a recently published article, Professor Bloom argues that
consent decrees may be modified “‘only to the extent that equity requires,’” such that consent decrees are
different from injunctions and are “not . . . subject to being reopened by Congress.” Bloom, supra note 54,
at 411 (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 391 (1992)). As discussed below,
however, the “equity requires” language Professor Bloom relies upon for his argument comes from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rufo and referred to the extent of modification and not whether consent
decrees should be modified in the first place. See infra text accompanying notes 161-63. In this latter
respect, which is the issue here, consent decrees and injunctions are treated similarly.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/2
p53 Hoffstadt.doc 05/20/99   12:00 PM
1999] RETAKING THE FIELD 79
injunction.142 To be sure, modification will be mandatory when the new law
makes one or more of the decree’s terms illegal.143 The Supreme Court has not
confined the rule of mandatory modification to just those modifications
necessary to avoid illegality, however. In System Federation No. 91 v.
Wright,144 the Court examined how an amendment to the Railway Labor Act
that legalized “union shops” affected a consent decree that had barred them.
Although the decree continued to be legal under the newly amended Act
(because the new law did not require “union shops”), the Court nevertheless
required the decree to be modified. The Court reasoned that “[t]he parties
cannot, by giving each other consideration, purchase from a court of equity a
continuing injunction” notwithstanding subsequent changes in the law.145
The Court’s most recent exposition on when consent decrees must be
modified, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,146 in l rge part reaffirms the
Court’s earlier precedent. In that case, the Court determined whether its
intervening decision in Bell v. Wolfish,147 regarding the constitutionality of
double bunking prison inmates, and increases in the inmate population
necessitated the modification of a consent decree governing the construction of a
new county jail. In deciding this question, the Court set forth the threshold
standard as to when consent decrees should be modified: “A party seeking
modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by showing a
significant change either in factual conditions or in law.”148
142. The same rule holds when it comes to changes in the decisional law. In Pasadena City Board of
Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), the Supreme Court reversed a district court’s decision not
to modify a school desegregation decree in light of the Court’s intervening decision in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Court found that the lower court
had “overlook[ed] well-established rules governing modification of even a final decree entered by a court
of equity.” Spangler, 427 U.S. at 437; cf. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388-90 (mandating modification for bona
fide changes in decisional law, but leaving it optional for “clarifications” in decisional law).
143. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388 (setting forth rule requiring mandatory modification “if, as it later
turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties [by the decree] has become impermissible
under federal law”).
144. 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
145. Id. at 651. This rule is consistent with the Court’s more general view that a court’s power to
modify a consent decree is constrained more by the underlying statutory law than by the terms of the
decree. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 576 n.9 (1984) (overturning
district court’s modification of decree because modification, while consistent with parties’ intent, would
have caused decree to conflict with statutory law forming its basis).
146. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
147. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
148. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384. This standard marked a departure from the standard previously set down
in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932), which allowed modification upon “[n]othing less
than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions.” Id. at 119.
Technically speaking, modification of a decree is not effected under Rufo, but under Rule 60(b)(5) of
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The courts of appeals are currently divided on whether the Rufo standard
applies in situations aside from the institutional reform context of Rufo itself.
Six of the eight circuits have applied some variant of Rufo’s modification
standard to all consent decrees,149 while the Federal and Sixth Circuits have
largely confined Rufo to its facts.150 Determining which of these competing
interpretations of Rufo is truest to the Supreme Court’s intent is beyond the
scope of this Article (and is dealt with in other scholarship),151 but it s worth
noting that the weight of appellate authority favors a broad reading of Rufo and
those decisions are, in that regard, well reasoned. If and when the Supreme
Court resolves this split of authority, it is likely that the Court will hold that
Rufo’s modification standard applies at the very least to the regulatory consent
decrees that are the subject of this Article. The Court hinted as much in Agostini
v. Felton,152 when it relied upon the Rufo standard to examine a motion to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which empowers a federal court to relieve a party from a final
court order when “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). Rufo nevertheless establishes that it is inequitable for a court to maintain a decree
when the law or facts that initially justified the decree have been altered by Congress.
149. Three circuits have held that all of Rufo’s standard is to be applied to motions to modify all
decrees. See Bellevue Manor Assocs. v. United States, 165 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e join a
significant number of other Courts of Appeals in finding that Rufo sets forth a general, flexible standard
for all petitions brought under the equity provision of Rule 60(b)(5).”); United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“We therefore agree . . . that Rufo gave the ‘coup de grace’ to
Swift”); Hendrix v. Page (In re Hendrix), 986 F.2d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Supreme Court gave
[Swift] the coup de grace in [Rufo,]” such that “the ‘flexible standard’ adopted in Rufo is no less suitable
to other types of equitable case[s].” (citation omitted)). Two others have held that Rufo applies to motions
to modify all decrees but should be applied with solicitude of whether the underlying decree protects fully
accrued private rights or involves the supervision of changing conduct or conditions. See Alexis Lichine &
Cie. v. Sacha A. Lichine Estate Selections, Ltd., 45 F.3d 582, 586 (1st Cir. 1995) (describing Rufo and
Swift “as polar opposites of a continuum in which we must locate [a particular] case”); Building & Constr.
Trades Council v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 880, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1995) (adopting Alexis rule). Finally, one other
has held that Rufo does not apply to motions to modify all decrees, but only to those decrees of a “public
nature.” See Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union of New York, 13 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir.
1993) (Rufo applies where the injunction to be modified seeks “to vindicate significant rights of a public
nature”).
150. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558, 562 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The
institutional reform cases present considerations not found in consent decrees settling commercial
disputes”); cf. Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1148-49 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding
Rufo appropriate for “institutional reform” litigation, and implying that Rufo should not apply outside that
context).
151. See, e.g., Jed Goldfarb, Note, Keeping Rufo in Its Cell: The Modification of Antitrust Consent
Decrees after Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625 (1997) (arguing that
Rufo’s standard should not apply to antitrust consent decrees); Bernard T. Shen, Comment, From Jail
Cell to Cellular Communication: Should the Rufo Standard Be Applied to Antitrust and Commercial
Consent Decrees?, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1781 (1996) (arguing that Rufo’s standard should apply to
commercial and antitrust consent decrees as well as to institutional reform decrees).
152. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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modify an injunction between a school district and private parties that regulated
the district’s provision of educational services to religious schools. Because
most regulatory consent decrees are equally, if not more, concerned with
ongoing regulation involving issues of “public” dimension than the decree in
Agostini, it is fair to assume that Rufo’s modification standard will be applied to
those decrees as well.153
After announcing its modification standard, the Court in Rufo went on to
explain when modification is mandatory once its threshold was met. As
expected, the Court reaffirmed that modification is mandatory if the change in
law renders the decree wholly or partially illegal.154 Where the change in law
does not render the decree illegal, but instead “make[s] legal what the decree
was designed to prevent,” whether modification is warranted depends on the
nature of the new law.155 If the new law constitutes a clarification of the old law,
modification is discretionary; if there is a genuine change in the law, Wright’s
rule of mandatory modification governs.156 The distinction between a
clarification in the prior law and a bona fide change to it, although not explicitly
defined by the Court in Rufo, seems to turn on the state of the law at the time the
parties entered into the decree. If the law was unclear and the parties entered
into the decree notwithstanding the uncertainty, subsequent changes to the
relevant law are likely to be considered a clarification and the parties will not be
entitled to automatic modification;157 because the parties may have simply
agreed to abide by the terms of the decree no matter what the law required, later
clarification of the law does not vitiate their consent to the decree.158 T  Cou t
found this to be the case in Rufo itself, where the parties agreed to build a jail
with single bunking even though a case regarding the constitutionality of double
bunking was pending before the Supreme Court at the time the decree was
approved.159 When the law is clear at the time that the parties negotiated the
decree, however, the parties are likely to have considered the law at the time as
the regulatory baseline, such that changes in the law warrant modification of the
153. At least one court of appeals has used much the same reasoning to reach the same conclusion.
See Bellevue Manor Assocs., 165 F.3d at 1255-56.
154. See 502 U.S. at 388.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 388-90; see also Catherine G. Patsos, Note, The Constitutionality and Implications
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 205, 225 (1998) (observing how Rufo drew
line between “changes” in law and “clarifications” of law).
157. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388-90.
158. See id. at 388.
159. See id.
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decree.160
A handful of lower courts have read Rufo differently, insisting that
modification of a consent decree is discretionary even in the face of genuine
changes in the law.161 The basis for this view is a passage in Rufo that provides
“a consent decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only to the extent
that equity requires.”162 But this statement was made in the middle of a
discussion about the Court’s requirement that any “proposed modification [be]
suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”163 Thus, the “equity requires”
standard refers to the extent of the modification, not whether it is required in the
first place.
Notwithstanding Rufo’s distinction between clarifications and changes in the
law, Congress has the power to make modification of all decrees mandatory by
making any contrary rule illegal, thereby rendering any decree inconsistent with
the new law illegal and subject to mandatory modification. This power makes
consent decrees virtually indistinguishable from injunctions. Equating these two
types of prospective relief is also sound from a policy standpoint. As the Court
in Wright observed, it makes no sense to give the parties to a consent decree the
power to exempt themselves from genuine changes in the law when the parties
would not have this option if they were subject to a court-ordered injunction.164
160. See id. at 390.
161. In their view, a change in law may not warrant modification unless “equity requires.” See, e.g.,
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 657 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Rufo, 502 U.S. at
391), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366 (1998); see also Bloom, supra note 54, at 411.
162. 502 U.S. at 391.
163. Id.
164. System Fed’n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1961). Of course, this does not stop
parties to consent decrees from trying. The model consent decree included as part of the Multistate
Settlement with the Tobacco Industry, for example, provides that “a change in law that results . . . in more
favorable or beneficial treatment of any one or more of the [tobacco companies] shall not support
modification of this Consent Decree.” See Part VI.C., available at <http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/
Extra/multistate_settlement.htm>. The success of such efforts has yet to be determined. See Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223-24 (1986) (“Contracts, however express, cannot fetter
the constitutional authority of Congress.” (quoting Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 307
(1935))); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (1998) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming this
language).
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3. Changes in the Law
Once it is established that Congress may constitutionally change the law and
thereby affect consent decrees in much the same fashion as it could change the
law and affect pending cases, it is necessary to consider whether there are limits
as to which laws Congress may change for this purpose. As discussed above,
Congress is limited in two ways when it seeks to change the law affecting
pending cases: (i) it cannot change the courts’ interpretation of constitutional
law and (ii) it cannot make the continued jurisdiction of the courts dependent
upon a preordained substantive outcome.165 The prohibition against tampering
with judicial interpretations of constitutional law would seem to apply with
equal force when Congress attempts to change the law that affects final
judgments because modification of such interpretations is simply “off limits” to
the legislative branch except through the amendment process.
The singular constraint on Congress’s ability to alter statutory law affecting
final judgments is United States v. Klein.166 While Klein itself dealt with
pending cases, the Court in both Robertson and Plaut observed that Klein is at
least relevant in the context of final judgments.167 Klein’s relevance is logical,
given that final cases involving prospective relief, like those cases that are not
yet final, are still “within” the court system and thus affected by an
impermissible withdrawal of the courts’ jurisdiction. In light of the narrow
interpretation the Court has given Klein in its own context, however, it comes as
little surprise that the Court has also not read Klein as a significant limitation on
Congress’s power to amend the law underlying prospective relief awarded upon
final judgment. In fact, the Court has held that Klein’s “prohibition does not
take hold when Congress ‘amend[s] applicable law,’” and the Court has defined
“applicable law” quite broadly.168
At the center of the universe of applicable law that may be amended by
Congress are the statutes on which an injunction or decree is based. In Wright,
for example, when Congress amended section 2 of the Railway Labor Act, the
Court held that a consent decree based on section 2 had to be modified in light
165. See supra Part I.A.1.
166. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
167. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (finding no Klein violation
regarding change in law affecting final judgments); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429,
441 (1992) (finding no Klein violation regarding change in law affecting outstanding injunctions).
168. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (quoting Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441).
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of the change.169 When altering the statutes underlying a decree, Congress may
also use shorthand. In Robertson, the Court had no difficulty construing the
Northwest Timber Compromise, which created an alternative means of
“meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for [three named]
consolidated cases,” as an amendment to the five statutes underlying those
cases.170 Despite the absence of any express reference to those statutes, the
Court concluded the Compromise “operat[ed] . . . [to] modif[y] the old
provisions.”171
The Ninth Circuit upheld an even more obscure “shorthand” amendment to
the law underlying an injunction in Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas.172 In
that case, a group of environmentalists had obtained an injunction barring the
University of Arizona from constructing a telescope atop a mountain in
Arizona. In response, Congress enacted the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of
1988 (“AICA”)173 and specified that the requirements of the National
Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (“NEPA”) and the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”) “‘shall be deemed satisfied’” by the University if it constructed the
telescope within a specified area.174 When the University changed its mind and
proposed a new site outside of the area specified by the AICA, Congress again
stepped in and enacted a statute that declared that the University’s new proposal
would be deemed to satisfy the AICA.175 The court of appeals found the second
amendment constitutional as a shorthand means of amending the environmental
statutes underlying the original suit.176 Judge Noonan wrote separately to note
that “[a] more explicit intervention of Congress into a judicial proceeding would
be difficult to imagine,” but he concurred in the result because Congress had in
169. See 364 U.S. at 650-52.
170. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 435 (1992) (quoting Department of the
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, sec. 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701,
747 (1989)).
171. Id. at 438. There is some scholarly dispute over whether the Rescissions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
19, 109 Stat. 194 (1995), which purported to modify any number of unspecified environmental statutes,
would be constitutional under Robertson. Professor Bloom states that the Rescissions Act “sweeps much
further than the provisions of the Northwest Timber Compromise sustained in Robertson because of its
impact upon the permanent injunctions previously issued and its derogation of unspecified environmental
laws.” Bloom, supra note 54, at 401. Whether or not this is a valid observation (which it appears to be), it
is unlikely to be implicated when Congress retakes a field because in that case Congress will be earnestly
attempting to create a scheme of federal regulation and would accordingly have no need to resort to a
blunderbuss approach affecting untold numbers of unspecified statutes.
172. 89 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 1996).
173. Pub. L. No. 100-696, 102 Stat. 4571.
174. Mount Graham Coalition, 89 F.3d at 556 (quoting AICA, 102 Stat. at 4597, 4599).
175. See id.
176. See id. at 557.
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substance amended the NEPA and ESA, which was within its power to do.177
The applicable law that may be constitutionally amended extends far beyond
the statutes underlying the prospective relief, however. In Wheeling, for
instance, the Court did not require Congress to amend the common law of
public nuisance, which was the basis for the injunction barring the maintenance
of the bridge.178 Congress was instead permitted to amend the law governing
post roads so as to make the bridge a post road and thus no longer a public
nuisance.179
Congress also appears to be able to limit its amendment of applicable law to
certain cases. In Robertson, the Supreme Court purported to reserve judgment
on the constitutionality of this practice,180 but the Court’s prior precedent gives
a strong indication as to how the Court may rule when squarely confronted with
the issue. In Wheeling, the Court allowed Congress to enact a statute that
reached no further than the bridge at issue in the underlying litigation.181
Similarly, the Court in Robertson itself upheld the Northwest Timber
Compromise that amended the five environmental statutes only as they applied
to certain forests in Oregon and Washington,182 which not coincidentally were
the same forests at issue in the consolidated lawsuits named in the amendment.
The lower federal courts have read this precedent to allow such targeted
statutory amendments. In Mount Graham, both the AICA and the law
amending the AICA amended the NEPA and ESA only as those statutes applied
to the particular dispute in question; the Ninth Circuit still upheld the statutes.183
177. Id. at 558-59 (Noonan, J., concurring).
178. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 521 (1851) (original
injunction based on public nuisance law).
179. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430-32 (1855)
(allowing modification of injunction through legislation declaring that bridge was post route).
180. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (reserving judgment on whether
“a change in law, prospectively applied, would be unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly,
or little more broadly, than the range of applications at issue in the pending cases”).
181. See 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 432; accord BellSouth Corp v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 693 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (upholding, against a separation of powers challenge, section 271 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 because “the [Supreme] Court upheld precisely this type of specificity in Wheeling”).
182. The amending provision in Robertson read:
[T]he Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3)
and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of
Land Management lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate
consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated
cases captioned [listing cases].
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, sec.
318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 747 (1989) (emphasis added), quoted in Robertson, 503 U.S. at 434-35.
183. Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 1996). The initial AICA provision
“specified that, for the portion of the project within [the specified area], the requirements of Section 7 of
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Congress’s broad authority to amend statutory law that affects consent
decrees is entirely consistent with the purposes animating the separation of
powers guarantee. The primary aim of this guarantee, as discussed above, is to
“guard against ‘encroachment or aggrandizement’ by [one branch] at the
expense of the other branches.”184 Article I vests Congress with “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted”185 and specifically enumerates the subjects over which
this power may be exercised.186 As long as the law Congress amends falls
within the language of Article I, Congress is doing no more than exercising its
constitutionally granted powers. That the amendment happens to affect consent
decrees does not mean that Congress has encroached upon the judicial branch,
for the Judiciary, as noted above, has no constitutionally cognizable interest in
seeing that statutory law is not changed. Indeed, a separation of powers
violation would arise if Congress did not have the power to amend statutory law
that affects consent decrees because in that situation the Executive (by
proposing a decree) and the Judiciary (by approving it) would be able to prevent
the Legislature from exercising its law-making authority over an area otherwise
within Article I. This would permit these two branches to encroach on the
legislative power reserved exclusively to Congress.187
Once it is established that Congress may amend the particular statute
underlying a consent decree, it follows that the separation of powers guarantee
does not place any constraints on which statute Congress may amend to affect
the decree as long as that statute is within the power of Congress to amend. Nor
would separation of powers seem to place any constraints on the targeting of
these amendments to particular cases, although the Equal Protection Clause, as
discussed more fully below, might do so.188
the Endangered Species Act ‘shall be deemed satisfied,’ as shall the requirements of Section 102(2)(c) of
NEPA.” Id. at 556 (quoting AICA, 102 Stat. at 4597, 4599). The amendment to the AICA stated, “The
United States Forest Service approval of alternative site 2 . . . is hereby authorized and approved and shall
be deemed to be consistent with, and permissible under, the terms of [AICA].” Id. (quoting the Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 335, 110 Stat. 1321).
184. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion) (internal citation omitted); see also supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
186. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
187. In Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1997), the First Circuit made the
same observation.  The court noted that if Congress was barred from amending statutes that happened to
underlie a consent decree, Congress would be deprived to its legislative power. Nor would it be an answer
to say that Congress could still amend the law as to persons not governed by a decree, for that would
permit the outstanding consent decrees to remain valid even though Congress had done everything in its
power to eliminate the law underlying them.
188. See infra Part I.C.1.
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Reading the separation of powers guarantee to permit congressional
modification of statutory law underlying consent decrees is also consistent with
the current understanding of why the Framers drew the lines they did between
the legislative and judicial powers. Prior to the ratification of the Constitution,
state legislatures often functioned as “courts of equity of last resort” by passing
“special bills or other enacted legislation” to overturn court decisions with which
they disagreed.189 This practice, known as “legislative equity,” fell into disfavor
in the years immediately preceding the Constitutional Convention and was
repeatedly denounced in the Federalist Papers.190 In Federalist No. 48, in
particular, Madison expressed concern with how, by engaging in legislative
equity, “[t]he legislative department [of the States] is everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”191 To
solve this unsavory problem, Hamilton later wrote in Federalist No. 81, limits
would have to be placed on the power of the Federal Legislature: “A legislature,
without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a
particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases.”192
Drawing upon these writings, the Framers separated the judicial power to decide
cases from the legislative power to enact laws and, in Article III, vested the
former solely in the hands of the Judiciary.193
As one might expect, the Constitution’s newly created division of authority
precluded Congress from engaging in the practice of legislative equity: The
Article III courts have the power to finally decide cases, so that once a case is
finally decided, it cannot be overturned by Congress’s exercise of its legislative
power.194 The Framers’ desire to stamp out legislative equity on the federal level
would not, however, seem to prohibit Congress from exercising its legislative
power to make statutory law when those laws affect cases that are still before
the federal courts. In that class of cases, which would seem to include those in
which prospective relief has already been awarded, the federal courts are still in
the process of applying federal statutory law. In that respect, the cases are
“future cases,” for which even Hamilton himself acknowledged that Congress
189. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (citing GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 154-55 (1969)).
190. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219-23 (collecting sources).
191. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 147 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966).
192. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 245 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966).
193. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
194. The Supreme Court recognized as much in its precedent stretching from Hayburn’s Case in
1792 to Plaut in 1995. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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could “prescribe . . . new rule[s].”195 As a result, allowing Congress to modify
statutory law underlying consent decrees is entirely consistent with the Framers’
desire to end the practice of legislative equity.
Even if the Framers envisioned a broader role for the separation of powers
guarantee, it is doubtful that the guarantee would reach so far as to prohibit
congressional displacement of regulatory consent decrees. It was not until the
1930s that Congress began to use the Commerce Power as a means of greatly
expanding the number of industries subject to federal regulation. It was not until
even more recently that judicial consent decrees came to be used as a tool for
settling lawsuits between the United States and industry participants subject to
federal law, thereby involving the federal courts in the business of developing
and administering federal law—in other words, the business of legislating.196
While such judicial regulation of an industry is undoubtedly within the Article
III power of the federal courts, because it involves the resolution of a “Case or
Controversy,”197 it nevertheless seems to be far from the core duty of the courts
because it entails far more than the resolution of a dispute between parties. As a
result, a law that displaces a regulatory decree does not interfere with an
exclusively judicial function so much as it transfers the quasi-legislative
function performed by regulatory decrees back to Congress, the entity charged
by the Constitution with the development of federal statutory law. For these
reasons, laws that modify or eliminate consent decrees are consistent with the
separation of powers guarantee.
4. The PLRA and the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The above analysis suggests that neither the PLRA nor the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 violates the separation of powers guarantee.
Section 3626 of the PLRA requires any consent decree dealing with prison
administration to be terminated unless the court is able to make three findings:
that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than is necessary to correct
a violation of a federal right, and is the least intrusive means of correcting the
195. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 192, at 245.
196. As the Fifth Circuit recently observed, “the [AT&T Consent Decree] was far from a final
resolution of the nation’s telecommunications dilemma. Its enforcement and alteration in the light of
technological progress and changing market circumstances ultimately required substantial monitoring on
the part of the district court, and the extensive judicial tinkering that resulted prompted many pundits to
dub District Judge Greene the country’s ‘telecommunication’s czar.’” SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
197. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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violation.198 The split among the courts of appeals over the constitutionality of
this provision can be traced to a disagreement over which “law” the PLRA
purports to change. The vacated Ninth Circuit panel, based on its belief that the
only applicable law that could be amended by Congress was the law underlying
the decree itself, found the PLRA unconstitutional because the applicable law
underlying most prison decrees is the Constitution, which is beyond the power
of Congress to amend.199 The premise of the Ninth Circuit’s argument—that the
only applicable law that may be amended is the substantive law underlying a
decree—is at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in Wheeling, which takes
a broader view of which laws Congress may amend. The other circuits to
consider the issue took this broader view of the applicable law and characterized
the PLRA as an amendment to the law governing the remedial authority of the
federal courts.200 Because this characterization of the PLRA is consistent with
Wheeling, and because Congress clearly has the authority to control the federal
courts’ remedial authority, the PLRA’s termination provision is consistent with
the separation of powers guarantee.
This conclusion is not without its critics, however. Professor Bloom
contends that the PLRA violates the separation of powers guarantee because it
“virtually compel[s] a decision favorable to the governmental entity
involved.”201 For the reasons noted above, however, the basis of a separation of
powers violation is not that Congress dictates a particular result in a case, but
that it does so in an improper manner—that is, by tampering with the
jurisdiction of the federal courts so as to make continued jurisdiction contingent
upon a certain substantive outcome.202 Because the PLRA effects a bona fide
change in the law governing the federal courts’ remedial authority, it does not
commit the sin condemned in Klein for, as the Court in Plaut observed,
“[Klein’s] prohibition does not take hold when Congress ‘amend[s] applicable
law.’”203
198. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
199. See Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th
Cir. 1998).
200. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2368 (1998);
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 657 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
2366 (1998); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 174 (2d Cir. 1997); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d
1081, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2374 (1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d
1424 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2375 (1998); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 372 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2460 (1997).
201. Bloom, supra note 54, at 410.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
203. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (quoting Robertson v. Seattle
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is also a permissible exercise of
Congress’s power under the separations of power guarantee. The Act itself
supersedes three decrees—the AT&T Consent Decree, the GTE Consent
Decree, and the McCaw Consent Decree—each based on antitrust law.204 The
Telecommunications Act does not amend antitrust law, however.205 It amends
the Communications Act of 1934. Congress’s decision to amend the narrower
subset of laws governing telecommunications instead of changing the antitrust
laws governing all industries is of no consequence. Under the Court’s separation
of powers jurisprudence, Congress is not obligated to amend the antitrust laws
in order to affect decrees based on that law. Moreover, regulation of the
telecommunications industry is within Congress’s Article I power.
The courts of appeals appear to have reached the same conclusion, although
their specific holdings are a bit baffling. The Fifth Circuit held that under
Wheeling and Robertson, “Congress may change the law underlying ongoing
equitable relief, even if . . . the change is specifically targeted at and limited in
applicability to a particular injunction.”206 In a similar vein, the D.C. Circuit
held that under Wheeling, Congress could “eliminate the prospective effects of
the [AT&T Consent Decree] and provid[e] new restrictions to govern the future
acts of the [Bell companies] in its place.”207 What is baffling is that these courts
were not examining section 601(a)(1)—the provision that repealed the AT&T
Consent Decree and thus the provision most relevant to a separation of powers
inquiry (because it is the provision actually affecting the prior judicial decrees).
Instead, they were analyzing whether the replacement scheme Congress enacted
to fill the void created by section 601(a)(1) violated the separation of powers
guarantee. It is difficult to see how the replacement legislation could abrogate
the power of the Judiciary since it does not affect the Judiciary or any of its
orders. That the courts analyzed the wrong provisions is understandable,
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992)).
204. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 139, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982) (AT&T Consent
Decree settling Sherman and Clayton Act lawsuits), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983); United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984) (GTE Consent Decree
settling Clayton Act lawsuit); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 158 F.R.D. 211, 213 n.4 (D.D.C.
1994), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (AT&T-McCaw consent decree settling Clayton Act
lawsuit).
205. Indeed, Congress expressly provided that, with a few narrow exceptions, “nothing in th[e] [new]
Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the
applicability of any of the antitrust laws.” Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. 61, 143.
206. SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 245 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
889 (1999).
207. BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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however, because the plaintiffs in those suits (the Bell operating companies)
intentionally framed the issue that way—had the plaintiffs framed the issue
properly, they would have been asking the Court to reinstate the AT&T Consent
Decree, a result they clearly did not want.
These cases aside, the Telecommunications Act raises one further issue,
however, for section 601(a) of the Act might be read as a self-executing
termination of the three outstanding consent decrees. There is a strong argument
that such a congressional directive to dissolve a decree encroaches upon the
power of the Judiciary, which retains sole control over its docket. To be sure,
Congress does not implicate this potential limitation when it changes the law but
says nothing to the courts, effectively leaving it to the parties to bring the
statutory amendment to the courts’ attention. This is essentially what happened
in Wheeling, where Congress declared the Ohio River bridge to be lawful but
relied upon the parties to plead the change in law to the courts. This is clearly
acceptable because Congress does not even purport to tell the courts what to do.
Nor would Congress seem to cross the line by exercising judicial power
when it changes the law and instructs the courts to modify outstanding decrees
to the extent the courts find the decrees inconsistent with the new law. This is
essentially what the PLRA requires because it orders the federal courts, upon
motion of the parties, to terminate any consent decree unsupported by the proper
findings.208 Even though Congress is more expressly telling the courts what to
do, the effect of that command is no different from the first scenario: The court
is obligated to modify the decree in light of the change in law209 but is still the
entity responsible for performing the judicial function of actually modifying the
decree.210 The courts’ power remains intact, so there is no separation of powers
violation here. But when Congress declares an outstanding decree null and void,
it may cross the line of permissible activity by negating a judicial order and
encroaching upon the prerogative of the Judiciary to render dispositive
judgments.211
Section 601(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, while implicating
this possible additional limitation, probably does not violate it. The language in
section 601(a) can be read as an instruction to the district court to dissolve the
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
209. See supra notes 143-64 and accompanying text.
210. See Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397, 404 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (upholding termination
provision of PLRA because it “does not mandate the courts to terminate cases without review by the
courts”).
211. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p53 Hoffstadt.doc 05/20/99   12:00 PM
92 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:53
prior antitrust decrees in light of the change in statutory law, and probably
should be read that way given the maxim against construing statutes to be
unconstitutional.212 Indeed, the district court itself seemed to read section 601(a)
that way when it dissolved the AT&T Decree in response to the Act.213
This review of the relevant case law indicates that Congress may, without
violating the separation of powers guarantee, enact statutes that change the law
affecting outstanding consent decrees in order to replace those decrees with
federal legislation. The twin limits on this power are narrow: Congress may not
alter constitutional law and Congress may not directly declare the previous
decrees null and void.
B. Contract-Based Claims
Although the separation of powers guarantee poses the largest potential
constitutional impediment to congressional efforts to replace federal consent
decrees with legislation, it is far from the only potential roadblock. A consent
decree, as noted above, “ha[s] attributes both of contracts and of judicial
decrees.”214 To the extent a consent decree prescribes no more relief than that to
which the parties are entitled by statute, it is arguably indistinguishable from an
injunction. While it is true that even this type of consent decree is a contract
insofar as its specific terms are agreed to by the parties and not dictated by the
court,215 the terms are nevertheless within the bounds of what could have been
ordered by the court and thus within the contemplation of the statute underlying
the order. As such, the parties should have no contractual or property rights in
the decree in light of the general “presumption . . . that ‘a law is not intended to
212. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”).
213. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (HHG), 1996 WL 255904 (D.D.C. Apr.
11, 1996) (“the Court will enter an order terminating the [AT&T Consent] decree, nunc pro tunc, as of
February 8, 1996”). The same district court also lifted the GTE Decree at the Justice Department’s
request. See Order Lifting GTE Decree, United States v. GTE Corp. (D.D.C. 1996) (No. 83-1298)  (on
file with author). Because the AT&T-McCaw Decree had not yet been formally entered by the district
court when the Telecommunications Act became law (only an interim stipulation was in effect), there was
no decree to dissolve, although the interim stipulation was eliminated when the Justice Department moved
to voluntarily dismiss the underlying Clayton Act suit. See Notice of Dismissal, United States v. AT&T,
(D.D.C. 1996) (No. 94-01555) (on file with author).
214. Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986) (quoting United States v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-37 n.10 (1975)); see also supra text accompanying notes
139-40.
215. See Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 519.
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create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be
pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.’”216
The Supreme Court relied upon this general rule in Bowen v. Public
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment.217 At issue in that case was a
congressional repeal of a provision of the Social Security Act. Years before,
Congress had given the states the option of entering into contracts with the
Federal Government to bring their employees within the folds of the Social
Security Act.218 The State of California had done so and, as permitted by federal
law, had reserved the right to withdraw from the contract upon two years’
notice.219 In 1983 Congress repealed the statute insofar as it authorized
withdrawal by the states. California sued, claiming that the amendment
interfered with its contractual rights under its agreement with the Federal
Government.220 The Supreme Court rejected the argument, noting that the
contractual language regarding withdrawal “exactly tracked the language of the
statute, conferring no right on the State beyond that contained in [the statute]
itself.”221
Of course, a consent decree may afford the parties greater relief than a
statute would allow a court to award on its own after trial.222 To assess the
constitutionality of legislation that supersedes such a decree, it is necessary to
know whether a decree that awards more relief than the law itself would enable
a court to award creates a contractual or property interest in that relief sufficient
to trigger the constitutional provisions designed to protect such interests—the
Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Contracts Clause.
It is possible to argue that no property interest exists in these decrees
because they are in many respects indistinguishable from decrees that a court
could award. To begin with, these broader decrees are still court orders: “[A]
judgment upon consent is [still] ‘a judicial act.’”223 As such, they must be
216. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985)
(quoting Dodge v. Board of Ed., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)); see also Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers,
191 U.S. 379, 386-87 (1903) (Michigan statute exempting from taxation railroads operating in Michigan
above 44th parallel does not create contract with carriers that is breached upon repeal of statute); Pittman
v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1104 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] statute is presumed not to create
contractual rights.”).
217. 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
218. See id. at 45.
219. See id. at 48.
220. See id. at 49-50.
221. Id. at 55.
222. Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986).
223. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944) (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.
106, 115 (1932)).
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approved by a court before they acquire the force of law. Indeed, the approval
process itself is subject to significant judicial oversight,224 part cularly as to
decrees falling under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (or “Tunney
Act”), which obligates the court to find that approval of the decree will be “in
the public interest.”225 In all cases, however, a court can make its approval of
the decree contingent on modifications to the decree’s terms. Decrees awarding
greater relief than the statute allows are not immune from subsequent
modification when a “significant change either in factual conditions or in law”
occurs.226 Finally, noncompliance with these decrees, as with all other judicial
orders, “is enforceable by citation for contempt of court.”227
This argument is not entirely persuasive, however. While it is true that
consent decrees going beyond what the law requires are treated similarly to
decrees within the law’s contemplation once they obtain court approval, this
merely confirms the undisputed fact that these decrees are court orders. The
more salient point is that some of those decrees’ terms are simply beyond the
power of the court to award. Because the authority to impose those additional
terms does not come from the court, it necessarily comes from the parties’
mutual assent to those terms. While the parties, for the reasons noted above,
may not have any property interest in those terms of the decree within the
court’s authority to grant, the parties would seem to have a property interest in
those terms included solely by virtue of their private agreement, which is
essentially a contract over and above the requirements of the law. This Article
will now explore whether the parties’ interest is cognizable by any of the
224. For example, most courts will review the decree to assure that it is not unreasonable, inequitable,
unlawful, or unconstitutional. See, e.g., Stovall v. City of Cocoa, 117 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 1997);
Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995); United Black Firefighters Ass’n v.
City of Akron, 976 F.2d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Colorado, 937 F.2d 505, 509 (10th
Cir. 1991); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1383 (8th
Cir. 1990); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1361 (5th Cir. 1980).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1994); see United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)
(conducting Tunney Act review of consent decree between AT&T and United States governing breakup
and subsequent regulation of Bell companies), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983). Some members of the Court have opined that the authority granted to federal courts by the
Tunney Act comes at the expense of the executive branch and thus raises a colorable separation of powers
issue. See Maryland, 460 U.S. at 1005 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Justin Lilley, Comment, A
Judicial Role for Proceedings Involving Uncontested Modifications to Existing Consent Decrees, 41
CATH. U. L. REV. 665, 690-92 (1992) (further exploring this argument).
226. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992); see also United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) (“A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is
subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need. . . . The result is all one whether the decree has
been entered after litigation or by consent.”).
227. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 518.
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property clauses of the Constitution.
1. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”228 Thus,
legislation superseding a consent decree, which presumably does not provide
any compensation, will violate the Takings Clause if (i) the decree is “private
property” and (ii) the legislation effects a “taking” of the decree within the
meaning of the Clause.229
a. Private Property
Those provisions of a consent decree beyond the power of the court to award
are supported solely by agreement of the parties and, for that reason, most
closely resemble a contract. Ever since Lynch v. United States,230 he upreme
Court has recognized that “[v]alid contracts are property [for Takings Clause
purposes].”231 A contract exists even when the decree is regulatory and one of
the parties to the decree is the executive branch because the Lynch rule applies
“whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a State or the
United States.”232
Just last Term, however, a majority of the Court cast significant doubt on
whether Lynch should continue to apply to contracts not involving real or
personal property. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,233 a plurality of the Court
held that the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (“Coal Act”)
228. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
229. In the typical Takings Clause case, it is also necessary to show that the taking is uncompensated
in order to establish a constitutional violation. That is because the Takings Clause “does not prohibit the
taking of private property” but requires that any taking be justly compensated. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987). Because the type of property
interference occasioned by legislation that retakes a field is unlikely to afford compensation, any such
legislation is likely to violate the Constitution if it effects a taking of property. See Eastern Enters. v.
Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (1998) (plurality opinion) (assuming “the lack of a compensatory remedy”
with respect to legislation that imposed monetary liability on certain employers of coal miners); id. at
2154-57 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on plurality’s observation as
reason not to review this type of legislation under Takings Clause); id. at 2161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(same).
230. 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
231. Id. at 579; see Kris Kobach, Contingency Fees May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A
Constitutional Analysis of Congressional Interference with Tobacco Litigation Contracts, 49 S.C. L.
REV. 215, 231 (1998).
232. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579.
233. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
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violated the Takings Clause because it required mining companies to contribute
millions of dollars to fund the health benefits of certain retired employees
notwithstanding that some of those companies had never contractually promised
such benefits and had not been in the mining business for decades. Justice
Kennedy disagreed with the plurality. He understood the Coal Act to “simply
impose an obligation to . . . pay[] . . . benefits,”234 which was solely a monetary
liability that “neither target[ed] a specific property interest nor depend[ed] upon
any particular property for the operation of its statutory mechanisms.”235
Because, in his view, “the Government’s imposition of an obligation between
private parties, or destruction of an existing obligation, must relate to a specific
property interest to implicate the Takings Clause,”236 Justice Kennedy
concluded that the Act did not “take” “private property.” Justice Breyer, in a
dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, agreed with Justice
Kennedy on this point: “The ‘private property’ upon which the [Takings]
Clause traditionally has focused is a specific interest in physical or intellectual
property.”237 In the dissenters’ view, the Coal Act did not take any such
property: “This case involves, not an interest in physical or intellectual property,
but an ordinary liability to pay money . . . .”238
Under the reasoning employed by Justice Kennedy and the dissenters,
contracts not affecting rights in specific property would seem to fall outside the
ambit of private property protected by the Takings Clause. No Justice contested
that the Coal Act retroactively reallocated liability for health benefits, or that the
effect of the Act could be viewed in one of two ways—either as a seizure of the
mining companies’ money or as an abrogation of the contracts the mining
companies had entered into with their employees regarding health benefits. As a
result, if those two characterizations are interchangeable, the five Justices’
rejection of Takings Clause claims based on seizure of money would necessarily
imply their rejection of Takings Clause claims involving contracts not affecting
specific property rights.
The Supreme Court previously found two similar characterizations
234. Id. at 2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
235. Id. at 2156 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
236. Id. at 2156 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy
nevertheless concurred in the judgment, finding that the Coal Act’s imposition of health benefits liability
on mining companies as to their long-retired employees was so arbitrary as to violate the Due Process
Clause.
237. Id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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interchangeable in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.239 I  that case,
the Court considered a Takings Clause challenge to the Multiemployer Pension
Plan Amendments Act of 1980.240 The Act required employers withdrawing
from multiemployer pension funds to pay a withdrawal fee. Because a number
of the employees had previously signed contracts limiting their fund liability to
regular contributions (which ostensibly foreclosed the imposition of additional
withdrawal liability), the Act both imposed a monetary obligation and abrogated
contracts. The Court noted this fact but went on to uphold the Act.241
Indeed, Justice Kennedy in his Apfel concurrence seemed to recognize the
applicability of his rule to contracts not involving specific property, for in
support of his rule he distinguished the Court’s decisions in United States v.
Security Industrial Bank242 and Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford.243 Each of those decisions held that statutes interfering with contracts
involving specific property, while “fit[ing] but awkwardly into the analytic
framework” of the Takings Clause, nevertheless did fit.244 Thus, under this rule,
which five Justices—a majority of the Court—endorsed, contracts that do not
involve specific property are not private property within the meaning of the
Takings Clause. Accordingly, regulatory consent decrees, which by definition
are more often directed toward regulation of behavior than toward disposition of
specific property, would not be considered private property.
b. Taking
Assuming for the moment that consent decrees are private property, the next
question is whether legislation that supersedes those decrees and thus interferes
with the contractual rights contained therein amounts to a taking. It is hornbook
law that “not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has
been held to be a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense.”245 Ind ed, until 1922, it
was not even possible to take property except by physically invading real
239. 475 U.S. 211, 221, 223 (1986) (discussing plaintiff’s dual arguments that payment of money
and interference with prior contractual obligations constituted basis for Takings claim).
240. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1453 (1994).
241. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223.
242. 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
243. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
244. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. at 2156 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at
75).
245. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960); see also Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
States, 261 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1923) (“There are many laws and governmental operations which
injuriously affect the value of or destroy property . . . but for which no remedy is afforded [under the
Takings Clause].”).
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property. The Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon246 changed
this by recognizing that property can also be taken if it is subjected to excessive
regulation: “The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”247
A number of the Court’s “regulatory takings” cases have examined whether
legislation that interferes with contracts between private parties constitutes a
taking.248 Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States249 is one of the earliest cases
to do so. In that case, the United States Government had requisitioned one
manufacturer’s entire 1918 production of steel plate, thereby vitiating a contract
Omnia had to purchase that manufacturer’s steel. The Court acknowledged that
Omnia’s contract with the manufacturer was “property within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment”250 but declined to hold that the Government’s actions
constituted a taking of Omnia’s contract: “The conclusion to be drawn . . . is,
that for consequential loss or injury resulting from lawful governmental action,
the law affords no remedy.”251
The Court revisited this issue more extensively in Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp.252 In that case, the Court considered a facial Takings
Clause challenge to the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980.
The Act required any employer participating in a multiemployer pension benefit
plan to pay the plan an amount of money sufficient to cover its share of the
plan’s unfunded liabilities if it withdrew from the plan, even if the particular
plan’s Trust Agreement limited that employer’s obligation under the plan to the
amount of its periodic benefits contributions.253 The Court rejected the argument
246. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
247. Id. at 415.
248. These cases are to be distinguished from those cases in which federal legislation interferes with a
contract concerning a property right specifically guaranteed by state law. For example, in Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), the Court examined the constitutionality of the
Frazier-Lemke Act, which in the name of giving relief to debt-ridden farmers altered the rights accorded a
mortgagee under state law. The Court found the Act to constitute a taking, not because it interfered with
the “personal [contractual] obligation” of the mortgagee, but because it eliminated “substantive rights
[created by Kentucky law] in specific property acquired by the Bank prior to the Act.” Id. at 589-90.
Similarly, the Court in Armstrong concluded that a taking occurred when the Government refused to
recognize mechanic’s lien rights created by Maine law when it exercised its contractual rights and seized a
ship having such liens upon it. 364 U.S. at 48-49. Unlike Radford and Armstrong, the cases discussed in
the text do not involve contracts whose terms implicate state property rights.
249. 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
250. Id. at 508.
251. Id. at 510. The steel manufacturer had already been properly compensated by the Government.
See id. at 507.
252. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
253. See id. at 216-17.
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that the Act violated the Takings Clause simply because it required “one person
to use his or her assets for the benefit of another.”254 The Court also found the
fact that the Act vitiated the contractual terms of individual trust agreements
unconvincing: “[T]he fact that legislation disregards or destroys existing
contractual rights does not always transform the regulation into an illegal
taking.”255 The Court found the contractual argument particularly weak because
the provisions of the Act that interfered with those trust agreements were
“within the power of Congress to impose”:256
Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority
of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts
deal with a subject matter which lies within the control of Congress, they
have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions
from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts
about them.257
The Court nevertheless analyzed the Act under the regulatory takings
framework it developed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.258 The Penn Central case identified three factors that have “particular
significance” in determining “whether a particular [legislative] restriction will be
rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it”: (i) “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (ii)
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations”; and (iii) “the character of the governmental action.”259
The Court in Connolly concluded that the traditional Penn Central
regulatory takings analysis “reinforce[d]” its initial conclusion that the Act’s
withdrawal liability provisions were constitutional.260 The Act undeniably had
an economic impact because it permanently deprived the withdrawing employer
of the money the Act obligated it to pay. But the Court found that this impact
was in large part mitigated by a number of the Act’s other provisions that at
times exempted or reduced this withdrawal liability and by the fact that the
residual liability was often proportional to the employer’s experience with the
254. Id. at 223.
255. Id. at 224 (citing Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517 (1944)).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 223-24 (quoting Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R., 294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935)).
258. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
259. Id. at 124.
260. 475 U.S. at 225.
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plan.261 The Court also concluded that the Act’s imposition of withdrawal
liability did not upset any reasonable, investment-backed expectations because
pension plans had been “the objects of legislative concern long before the
passage of [the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)].”262 The
Court also pointed to the common sense notion that “[t]hose who do business in
[a] regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.”263 W th respect to Penn
Central’s last factor, the nature of the government action, the Court concluded
that the Act’s interference with employer’s contractual interests “arises [more]
from a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good”264 than from a “physical invasion by
government.”265 As a result, the Court felt that this factor weighed against a
finding that the Act constituted a taking.266 The Court reaffirmed this Takings
analysis in a subsequent as-applied challenge to the same Act in Concrete Pipe
& Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern
California.267
The Apfel decision draws on both Connolly and Concrete Pipe. The Apfel
plurality examined the three Penn Central factors as it had done in Connolly
and Concrete Pipe. The plurality reaffirmed those cases insofar as they
acknowledged that “Congress has considerable leeway to fashion economic
legislation, including the power to affect contractual commitments between
private parties.”268 In the plurality’s view, the Coal Act was unconstitutional
because it exceeded this leeway by “impos[ing] severe retroactive liability on a
limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the
extent of that liability [was] substantially disproportionate to the parties’
experience.”269
Although Omnia, Connolly, Concrete Pipe, and Apfel each dealt with
261. See id. at 225-26.
262. Id. at 226.
263. Id. at 227 (quoting FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)); see also Kobach, supra
note 231, at 237 (“Prior Congressional regulation of an area can also defeat a property owner’s assertions
of investment-backed expectations.”); Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 81, 100 (1997) (“Expectations are said to be unreasonable if parties holding the expectation
either had a duty to take future changes into account in their decisions, or somehow had notice of the
likelihood that there would be a change in the applicable law.”).
264. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
265. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
266. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
267. 508 U.S. 602, 641-46 (1993).
268. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. at 2149.
269. Id.
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legislation that affected contracts between private parties, their analyses should
apply with equal force to regulatory consent decrees to which the United States
is a party. To be sure, the fact that the Government is a party to the decree has
some effect on its authority to coopt the decree with legislation. If, for example,
the executive branch has explicitly agreed in the decree that Congress will not
modify the decree by changing the underlying law, it will be held to that promise
and will be estopped from exercising its sovereign power to enact legislation
affecting the underlying statutory law as to the parties to the decree.270
Alternatively, Congress may become financially liable if in the decree it
promised not to modify the underlying law.271 Neither of these consequences,
however, affects the constitutionality of these statutory amendments.
Under the Penn Central factors, as interpreted in Connolly, Concrete Pipe,
and Apfel, federal legislation that eliminates or modifies regulatory consent
decrees is not likely to violate the Takings Clause. To begin with, displacement
of a regulatory consent decree is unlikely to have a significant economic impact.
Any economic impact would likely be confined to the difference in the costs of
complying with the two regulatory schemes. This impact should be far more
modest than the impact of the Coal Act in Connolly, which imposed monetary
liability. Legislation displacing federal regulatory decrees also would not appear
to upset any reasonable, investment-backed expectations of the parties.
Regulatory decrees, like all decrees, are themselves subject to modification
under Rule 60(b) and Rufo. Further, the parties to those decrees are by
definition “do[ing] business in [a] regulated field” and thus, under Connolly,
“cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments
to achieve the legislative end.”272 Indeed, some regulatory decrees, the Florida
and Texas tobacco decrees in particular, expressly acknowledge the effect of
superseding legislation.273 Finally, this superseding legislation is more in the
270. “[I]t is clear that the National Government has some capacity to make agreements binding future
Congresses by creating vested rights.” United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2455 (1996).
However, a contract with a sovereign government will not be read to include an unstated term exempting
the other contracting party from the application of a subsequent sovereign act (including an act of
Congress), nor will an ambiguous term of a grant or contract be construed as a conveyance or surrender
of sovereign power.
Id. at 2456. This presumption against such terms is known as the “unmistakability doctrine.” See Bowen
v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 146-48 (1982).
271. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (Souter, J., plurality opinion).
272. 475 U.S. at 227 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
273. See Settlement Agreement at ¶ II(B)(5), Florida v. American Tobacco Co. (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
25, 1997) (No. 95-1466 AH), available at <http://stic.neu.edu/FL/flsettle.htm>; Comprehensive
Settlement Agreement and Release at ¶ 12, Texas v. American Tobacco Co. (E.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 1998),
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nature of a “public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good” than “a physical invasion by the government.”274
Therefore, congressional legislation that modifies or eliminates the terms of
outstanding regulatory consent decrees is unlikely to constitute a taking under
the Fifth Amendment.
2. The Contracts Clause
The Contracts Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”275 By its terms, this Clause does not
directly place any constraints on congressional efforts to influence federal or
state consent decrees.276 In its stead, the Supreme Court has examined federal
legislation that impairs private contracts under the rubric of the Due Process
Clause.277
3. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”278 Legislation that modifies or supersedes regulatory consent decrees
might violate the Due Process Clause in one of two ways.
First, the Due Process Clause may preclude Congress from enacting
legislation that impacts a regulatory consent decree to which the United States is
a party if, in the decree, the Government had promised expressly not to enact
such legislation. The first instance in which the Supreme Court recognized that
a government might contract away its sovereign power to change the law
involved a Contracts Clause challenge to a state law that abrogated a prior
available at <http://stic.neu.edu/Tx/Texas-Settlement.htm>; Memorandum of Understanding at ¶ 5, In re
Moore ex rel. Mississippi Tobacco Litig. (Chancery Ct. July 2, 1997) (No. 94-1429), available at
<http://stic.neu.edu/MS/mssettle.htm>.
274. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
276. The Supreme Court has long recognized this fact. See, e.g., Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2455 (“[T]he
Contract Clause has no application to acts of the United States . . . .”); Radford, 295 U.S. at 589
(“Congress . . . is not prohibited from impairing the obligations of contracts.”).
277. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 472 &
n.25 (1985) (noting that Due Process Clause requires Congress to justify as rational any “substantial”
impairment of contractual obligations caused by federal legislation); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984) (same).
278. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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bequest of land by the state legislature.279 The Supreme Court has subsequently
held that the Due Process Clause imposes a similar constraint on congressional
action. One Congress might contractually bind future Congresses by creating a
“vested right” in the current state of the law which, if abrogated by later
modification of the law, deprives the contracting party of his property without
due process.
In Lynch v. United States,280 for example, the Court struck down a federal
law that repealed all of the War Risk Insurance policies the Government had
entered into with veterans. “As Congress had the power to authorize the Bureau
of War Risk Insurance to issue [the policies],” the Court reasoned, “the due
process clause prohibits the United States from annulling them, unless, indeed,
the action taken falls within the federal police power or some other paramount
power.”281 Because no such supervening congressional power was at work, the
Court found “Congress [to be] without power to . . . abrogat[e] contractual
obligations of the United States.”282
The Court relied on much the same reasoning in Perry v. United States,283
where it found unconstitutional a law that abrogated a contractual term
contained in all previously issued United States bonds that made the bonds
redeemable “in U.S. gold coin of the present standard of value.”284 The Co rt
recognized that “[t]he argument in favor of [upholding the abrogating law], as
applied to government bonds, is in substance that the Government cannot by
contract restrict the exercise of a sovereign power.” But the Court found that
“the right to make binding obligations is a competence attaching to
sovereignty.”285 Because Congress “ha[d] not been vested with authority to alter
or destroy those obligations,” the Court found the act unconstitutional.286
Because this particular due process limitation constricts Congress’s
sovereign power, the Supreme Court is not anxious to find that the Government
279. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (holding that State of Georgia may not
repeal land grant it had previously awarded); Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2454-55 (detailing evolution of this
doctrine).
280. 292 U.S. 571 (1932).
281. Id. at 579.
282. Id. at 580. The exception for police powers was implicated in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), where the Court upheld a Minnesota law that temporarily extended the
period of redemption on mortgages (to forestall foreclosure) in light of the economic “emergency” of the
Great Depression.
283. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
284. Id. at 347.
285. Id. at 353.
286. Id. at 353-54.
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has ceded that power in a contract or decree. Toward that end, the Court has
developed a canon of contractual construction that is known as the
“unmistakability doctrine”: “[A] contract . . . will not be read to include an
unstated term exempting the other contracting party from the application of a
subsequent sovereign act (including an act of Congress), nor will an ambiguous
term of a grant or contract be construed as a conveyance or surrender of
sovereign power.”287 As a result, this due process limitation will not usually be
implicated by legislation that modifies or eliminates a regulatory consent decree
unless the Federal Government expressly covenanted in the decree not to modify
the relevant law.288
The second way that the Congress might violate the Due Process Clause is
if, in displacing a regulatory consent decree, it impairs the contractual terms of
the decree in an irrational way. As noted above, this guarantee is analogous to
that afforded by the Contracts Clause to similar legislation by the States.289 The
Court has been careful to stress, however, that “the limitations imposed on
States by the Contract Clause” are greater than “the less searching standards
imposed on [federal] economic legislation by the Due Process Clauses.”290
Under the Due Process Clause, this type of legislation “come[s] to the Court
with a presumption of constitutionality,” so “the burden is on one complaining
of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an
arbitrary and irrational way.”291
Legislation modifying or eliminating existing regulatory consent decrees is
likely to be rational and is therefore likely to pass muster under this rather
deferential standard. In some extreme cases, laws might be deemed irrational
because they apply “retroactively.”292 While it is possible to view legislation that
287. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2456; Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477
U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (“[W]ithout regard to its source, sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an
enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact
unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.” (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148
(1982))); cf. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 146 (rejecting argument that “the Tribe has abandoned its sovereign
powers simply because it has not expressly reserved them through a contract”).
288. What follows from violation of this limitation is not clear. While some of the Court’s opinions
indicate that the legislation itself would be invalidated, see Lynch, 292 U.S. at 586-87, other cases seem to
indicate that Congress would be liable for breach of contract. See Perry, 294 U.S. at 354-58 (discussing,
but rejecting, award of damages for breach of contract).
289. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 472
(1985); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984).
290. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 733.
291. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
292. See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2158-59 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(finding Coal Act’s retroactive imposition of health benefits liability on mining companies as to their long-
retired employees so arbitrary as to violate Due Process Clause).
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displaces decrees as retroactive insofar as it alters the terms of the already
existing decree, this is not the type of retroactivity that would of its own force
invalidate such legislation. To begin with, legislation that displaces a regulatory
consent decree does not impose liability after the fact for actions a party took in
the past (as the laws in Connolly, Concrete Pipe, and Apfel did). At most, this
legislation negates the applicability of a consent decree’s terms in the future.293
But it is hardly arbitrary—and is in fact necessary—for Congress to modify the
prospective effect of prior decrees in order for its new regulatory scheme to
apply to the parties subject to those decrees. Thus, legislation that retakes the
field will probably pass muster under the Due Process Clause.
C. Remaining Constitutional Claims
There are a handful of other constitutional objections that might be raised
against legislation that eliminates or modifies federal or state consent decrees,
although none are likely to be meritorious.
1. Equal Protection Guarantee
The guarantee of equal protection,294 which applies directly to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment and has been indirectly applied to the Federal
Government via the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,295 ensure  that
Congress acts rationally when it enacts economic legislation that treats similarly
situated groups differently.296 Because an equal protection violation presupposes
that persons are being treated differently, such a violation would only occur if
Congress decides to eliminate or modify some decrees but not others, or decides
to eliminate or modify a particular decree but only as to certain parties to the
decree.
Congress has not drawn such lines often, however. With the
293. See 47 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. II 1996) (historical and statutory notes containing section 601(a)(1)
of the Telecommunications Act) (modifying prospective effect of the three consent decrees previously
regulating the field).
294. “[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
295. See supra note 37.
296. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). The Supreme Court applies
greater level of scrutiny to “suspect” and “quasi-suspect” classes, such as race and gender, requiring the
government to make a stronger showing of justification for treating similarly situated groups differently.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (applying “strict scrutiny” to
distinctions legislature draws on basis of race); see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)
(applying “intermediate scrutiny” to distinctions legislature draws on basis of gender).
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Telecommunications Act of 1996, for instance, Congress eliminated all three
consent decrees that regulated the telecommunications industry—the AT&T
Decree, the GTE Decree, and the AT&T-McCaw Decree.297 Similarly, in the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, Congress prescribed that all institutional reform
decrees were subject to the Act’s termination provision.298 In both cases,
Congress treated all decrees in the relevant industry similarly, and thus never
triggered the primary concern animating the equal protection guarantee.
Even when Congress elects to regulate a subset of an “industry,” it will
probably be able to justify the differential treatment. In Robertson, for example,
the Northwest Timber Compromise only provided an alternative means of
satisfying five environmental statutes as those statutes applied to the forests at
issue in three cases with outstanding injunctions. In effect, the Compromise
modified only those injunctions even though it is likely that other injunctions
relying upon the same statutes were outstanding at that time.299 Al ough the
equal protection issue was not presented to the Supreme Court in that case, the
Compromise likely did not violate the equal protection guarantee. The Court has
long recognized that Congress rationally may solve a problem one step at a time
or, in this case, one geographic area or controversy at a time.300
Thus, while it is possible for Congress to transgress the equal protection line
by selectively modifying or eliminating consent decrees in an irrational way, this
situation is not very likely to arise.
2. Bill of Attainder Clause
The Bill of Attainder Clause provides that “[n]o Bill of Attainder . . . shall
be passed [by Congress].”301 A bill of attainder is defined as a “statute[] that
inflict[s] punishment on [a] specified individual or group.”302 The only way this
Clause might possibly be implicated by legislation that modifies or eliminates
consent decrees is if the Legislature declined to modify some decrees while
297. See 47 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. II 1996) (statutory and historical notes containing section 601(a)(1)
of the Telecommunications Act).
298. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
299. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 433-36 & n.1 (1992).
300. “Legislatures may implement their program step by step in such economic areas, adopting
regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to
future regulations.” City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (internal citation omitted);
see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 488-89 (1955).
301. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A similar limitation constrains the states. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . .”).
302. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 851 (1984).
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eliminating or favorably modifying others. In that situation, parties to the
unmodified decrees might argue that they were punished relative to those whose
decrees were favorably modified. This argument is unlikely to succeed,
however, because the Court judges whether a party is punished within the
meaning of this Clause by comparing a person’s position before the law in
question was enacted to her position afterwards—not by comparing the
postenactment positions of various parties.303 Thus, persons whose decrees were
not modified could not claim they were punished because the legislation in
question did not change their position at all. The Bill of Attainder Clause
therefore poses no impediment to legislation that abrogates consent decrees,
although it may play a greater role when evaluating that portion of the
legislation that replaces the superseded decrees.
3. Ex Post Facto Clause
The Constitution also bars Congress from enacting any ex post facto
laws304—laws that “appl[y] . . . any new punitive measure to a crime already
consummated.”305 The Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to penal legislation,
however.306 Because most legislation that supersedes regulatory consent decrees
is economic and therefore not criminal, this Clause will rarely be implicated by
such legislation.
II. THE ELIMINATION AND MODIFICATION OF STATE CONSENT DECREES
Congressional legislation that eliminates or modifies state consent decrees
faces a slightly different set of constitutional hurdles from legislation that
replaces federal consent decrees. As discussed above, both types of legislation
implicate the Constitution’s property clauses (and some of its other clauses) in
much the same way.307 But whereas legislation that displaces federal consent
303. See infra text accompanying notes 387-88.
304. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (limitation on congressional action); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
(limitation on states).
305. California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505 (1995) (citation and internal
quotations omitted).
306. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997) (“The Ex Post Facto Clause . . . has
been interpreted to pertain exclusively to penal statutes.”). Just last Term, however, Justice Thomas
expressed some interest in reconsidering this limitation. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131,
2154 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring).
307. If anything, legislation affecting state consent decrees is even more likely to be constitutional.
For instance, parties subject to a state consent decree would have even less of a vested property interest
under the Due Process or Takings Clauses in their decree given that a state has no authority to preclude
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decrees implicates the separation of powers guarantee, legislation that displaces
state consent decrees raises issues of preemption under the Supremacy Clause
and of federalism under the Tenth Amendment. It is to these issues unique to
state consent decrees that the Article turns next.
A. Preemption and the Supremacy Clause
One of the fundamental tenets of our system of dual sovereignty is that the
laws of the Federal Government take precedence over the laws of a state when
they conflict or overlap. This tenet is ingrained in the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, which provides that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”308 Thus, Congress may, by enacting
federal legislation on any subject properly within its enumerated powers,
displace, or “preempt,” the state law on that subject.309 Congr ss’s exercise of
“[p]re-emption [power] may be either expressed or implied, and ‘is compelled
whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’”310 Accordingly, whether
Congress may preempt regulatory consent decrees entered by state courts
depends upon whether those decrees are considered “a state law” subject to
preemption.311
State statutes are clearly state law that can be preempted by federal
federal intervention in a field; the most a state could do is make itself contractually liable for any changes
in regulation, as the Federal Government did to itself in Winstar, but that would not raise any
constitutional concerns.
308. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
309. “[S]ince our decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been settled that state law that conflicts
with federal law is ‘without effect.’” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (Stevens,
J., plurality opinion) (citations omitted); see also Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass’n, 505
U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (“But under the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived,
any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary
to federal law, must yield.” (citations and quotations omitted)); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341,
346 (1927) (“[Congress’s] power to regulate [interstate] commerce and all its instrumentalities is
supreme; and, as that power has been exerted, state laws have no application.”).
310. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quotation omitted). There are two types of “implied” preemption: (i) field
preemption and (ii) conflict preemption. Field preemption occurs when the scheme of federal regulation is
“so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 330 (1947). Conflict preemption occurs when either
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), or when the state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
311. See Cipollene v. Liggett, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/2
p53 Hoffstadt.doc 05/20/99   12:00 PM
1999] RETAKING THE FIELD 109
legislation. In fact, the very first preemption case, McCulloch v. Maryland,312
held that federal legislation preempted a Maryland statute imposing a tax on the
Bank of the United States. The common-law rules developed by the state courts
also fall within the definition of state law for the purposes of the Supremacy
Clause.313 Thus, the Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.314 was able to
conclude that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 preempted a number of state causes of
action (for example, failure to warn and fraudulent misrepresentation) that had
been recognized by the common-law jurisprudence of a number of states’
courts.315
Congress’s authority to preempt the orders of state courts, as opposed to the
common-law rules they follow, is not well established. It is fairly clear that a
state court order may be preempted if it does no more than give effect to the
state’s statutory or common law by awarding relief within its contemplation.
The handful of cases that have dealt with preemption of state court orders seem
to accept this proposition without much discussion. In Ridgway v. Ridgway,316
for example, the Court examined whether the Serviceman’s Group Life
Insurance Act (“SGLIA”), which granted an insured the right to designate the
beneficiaries of his policy at any time, preempted a state divorce decree in which
the insured had agreed to designate his children as the beneficiaries and not to
change that designation.317 The lawsuit arose when the insured violated the
decree by designating his second wife as the policy’s sole beneficiary. The
Court, after finding that Congress had intended the SGLIA to have preemptive
force, ruled in favor of the second wife on the ground that “a state divorce
decree, like other law governing the economic aspects of domestic relations,
312. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). There, the court stated:
[T]he States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers
vested in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy
which the constitution has declared. We are unanimously of opinion, that the law passed by the
legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, is unconstitutional and void.
Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
313. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522 (Stevens, J., plurality) (“At least since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
we have recognized the phrase ‘state law’ to include common law as well as statutes and regulations.”
(citation omitted)).
314. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
315. See id. at 530-32; accord Peter D. Enrich & Patricia A. Davidson, Local and State Regulation
of Tobacco: The Effects of the Proposed National Settlement, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 87 (1998) (taking
as given that Congress has power to preempt state and local regulation of tobacco industry, but arguing
that doing so may not be prudent as matter of public policy).
316. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
317. See id. at 47.
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must give way to clearly conflicting federal enactments.”318 A few years later, in
Rose v. Rose,319 the Court reaffirmed its unspoken assumption that Congress
could preempt state decrees, even though it rejected the specific preemption
argument in Rose.320 Congress has also operated on this assumption by enacting
legislation that preempts state court orders.321
It makes sense for Congress to have the power to preempt orders of state
courts that do no more than give effect to state statutory or common law.
Congress clearly has the authority to preempt the statutory or common law
itself, which would require modification of any orders giving effect to that prior
law. Whether Congress modifies those orders indirectly by preempting the
underlying law or directly by preempting the decrees themselves should not
matter under the Supremacy Clause. The Clause simply establishes the
supremacy of federal law over state law regardless of which branch of the state
government gives it effect.322
Nor does preemption of state court orders fail to accord them the full faith
and credit they are due under the Constitution and federal law. The
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause is inapplicable. By its own terms, it
only assures that the states respect one another’s court judgments: “Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State.”323 I  does not obligate the Federal
Government to do so. Congress nevertheless placed a similar obligation on the
318. Id. at 55.
319. 481 U.S. 619 (1987).
320. See id. at 628. The lower federal courts and state courts seem to be in agreement on this point.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that provision of
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act (“FEGLIA”) designating order of beneficiaries preempts a
state divorce decree requiring a different order of distribution on the ground that “a state divorce decree
. . . must give way to clearly conflicting federal enactments” (quoting Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46,
55 (1981))); Dean v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1989) (same); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 121
F.3d 364, 367 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that SGLIA preempted a state divorce decree, reasoning that “[i]t
has been consistently held in regard to FEGLIA that a divorce decree cannot operate as a waiver or
restriction of an insured’s right to change the beneficiary when federal regulations conflict”), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 693 (1998); Boulter v. Boulter, 930 P.2d 112, 113 (Nev. 1997) (concluding that federal Social
Security law preempts divorce decree that required each spouse to pay other one-half of social security
benefits).
321. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-18(e) (1994) (granting shared appreciated mortgages issued under this
section immunity from any “State constitution, statute, court decree, common law, rule, or public policy”);
id. § 1715z-17(d) (same); id. § 1715z-10(e) (granting same immunity to graduated payments and indexed
mortgages).
322. While the separation of powers guarantee concerns interbranch conflicts, it only applies among
branches of the Federal Government, and not between one branch of the Federal Government and another
branch of the state government. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
323. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Federal Government by statute:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any . . . State,
Territory or Possession . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory, or
Possession from which they are taken.324
Although this statute applies to “every court within the United States,” it
does not prevent Congress from giving state court orders less than full faith and
credit.325 Even if the statute did apply to Congress, its constraints could be
easily overcome by inserting a provision in any subsequent legislation excepting
that legislation from the application of the earlier full faith statute (since
Congress may amend one statute with another).326
The validity of legislation that preempts consent decrees that do no more
than give effect to state statutory or common law does not necessarily mean that
Congress may preempt all state court consent decrees because consent decrees
can embody agreements that go beyond the requirements of state law. On the
one hand, it may not be appropriate to segregate state consent decrees on the
basis of whether all of their terms are within the power of the state courts to
award, at least where the decrees are regulatory and joined by the state. After
all, even those decrees with terms that exceed the dictates of state statutory or
common law ostensibly reflect the will of the state’s executive. These decrees
thus reflect the will of the state, just as state statutes or common law do. It is
therefore difficult to defend differential treatment because the decree in either
case reflects the sovereign will.327
Even if one drew a distinction among regulatory consent decrees based on
324. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
325. Id.
326. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 130 n.3 (6th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that life insurance plan which was covered by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”) and which thus preempted a divorce decree with conflicting beneficiary designation
clause posed no problem under section 1738 because “nothing in [section 1738] purport[ed] to do away
with ERISA’s preemption of state law”).
327. Drawing such a distinction would seem to make more sense when the decree is between private
parties and especially when the court’s role in reviewing the decree’s terms is rather passive, for in that
situation, the court order is more likely to be a “rubber stamp” of what is essentially a private contract.
The wisdom of drawing a distinction even in this situation is not beyond question, however. In Boulter v.
Boulter, 930 P.2d 112, 114 (Nev. 1997), the Nevada Supreme Court held that a private property
settlement contract between divorcing spouses was preempted by the federal Social Security Act. Once the
contract was incorporated into their divorce decree, the court reasoned, it became part of the court order,
which the court held was “state action” subject to preemption. See id. at 113.
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whether they do more than give effect to state law, that distinction would seem
to be irrelevant for purposes of the Supremacy Clause. In fact, the Supreme
Court has yet to find this distinction relevant for these purposes. In Ridgway, the
Court held that a state divorce decree was preempted by the SGLIA without
asking whether any of the decree’s terms were beyond the state court’s power to
dictate on its own under state law.328 The Court’s later opinion in Rose is also
silent on this point.329
Precedent aside, it makes no sense to hinge Congress’s power to preempt
regulatory consent decrees on whether those decrees award more than state law
requires. As an initial matter, Congress’s unquestioned ability to impair, and
thereby preempt, private contracts (subject, of course, to the constraints
imposed by the Takings and Due Process Clauses discussed above) would seem
to significantly undermine the logic supporting such a distinction. If Congress
may preempt a wholly private contract, surely it must be able to preempt a
consent decree that is in part based on a private contract and in part based on
state statutory or common law, which is itself unquestionably preemptible.
Moreover, recognizing that Congress has the power to preempt all state
regulatory decrees would create the semblance of parity among the various
branches of state government. Under the Court’s precedent, Congress clearly
has the power to preempt state statutes, which are the product of the state’s
legislative branch. Congress also has the power to preempt state common law,
which is the product of the state’s judicial branch. Indeed, Congress even has
the power to preempt state regulations, which are often the product of the state’s
executive agencies.330 Recognizing that Congress may preempt state regulatory
decrees, which are often the product of the State’s executive and judicial
branches, is consistent with the Court’s view that the laws promulgated by all
three branches of the state are equally subject to the Supremacy Clause’s
mandate.
The consequences of limiting Congress’s preemptive power to decrees that
simply give effect to state law vividly illustrate why Congress must possess the
authority to preempt all regulatory consent decrees. If Congress could preempt
only those decrees implementing state statutory or common law, the states
would in essence have the power to circumvent the Supremacy Clause by opting
to regulate an industry through expansive consent decrees instead of by
328. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
329. 481 U.S. 619 (1987); see also supra text accompanying note 320.
330. See supra note 313.
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legislation. The creation of such a “no preemption” zone is, first and foremost,
at odds with the command of the Supremacy Clause, which makes “the Laws of
the United States . . . the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”331
Qualifying Congress’s preemptive power would also effectively confer upon the
states the power to contract away the Federal Government’s sovereign right to
amend federal law, which is a power that only the Federal Government
possesses and which only it can exercise using the most “unmistakable”
terms.332
Accordingly, Congress should, and does, have the authority under the
Supremacy Clause to enact legislation that preempts regulatory consent decrees
issued by state courts.
331. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 287-88. To be sure, a state may through its actions cede its
right to amend its own state law. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810)
(holding that Georgia may not nullify land grant issued by previous state legislature). But that rule does
not allow states to cede Congress’s right to amend federal law.
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B. The Tenth Amendment
The other potentially significant impediment to congressional legislation that
displaces state regulatory consent decrees is the Tenth Amendment, which
provides that: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”333
In determining whether a particular congressional enactment runs afoul of
this Amendment, the Court has at times asked “whether [the] Act of Congress
[at issue] is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I
of the Constitution.”334 At other times, it has inquired into “whether [the] Act
. . . invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment.”335 The Court recognizes, however, that “the two inquiries are
mirror images of each other,” both aimed at delineating “the division of
authority between federal and state governments.”336 Regardless of how the
Tenth Amendment inquiry is framed, the Court has held that the Amendment
imposes a few, specific limitations on Congress’s power to legislate, even on
matters otherwise within its enumerated powers.
The first major limitation is on Congress’s authority to subject States to
generally applicable federal laws. For a brief period, this limitation was a
significant one, effectively granting states immunity from federal legislation that
without sufficient justification “regulate[d] the States as States” and
“address[ed] matters that [were] indisputably attribute[s] of state
sovereignty.”337 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,338
however, the Court overruled its prior National League of Cities v. Usery339
decision and greatly curtailed the extent of immunity the states enjoy from
333. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
334. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 146 (1971); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 319 (1819)).
335. Id. at 155-56 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Lane
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869)).
336. Id. at 156.
337. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537 (citation and quotations omitted). The decision that gave rise to this
immunity was National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The immunity existed from
1976, when National League of Cities overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), until 1985,
when the Court in Garcia overruled National League of Cities. As Justice O’Connor observed with more
than a trace of understatement, “[t]he Court’s jurisprudence in this area has traveled an unsteady path.”
New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
338. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
339. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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generally applicable federal legislation.340 The Garcia majority felt that the
“structural protections of the Constitution [would] insulate the States from
federally imposed burdens.”341 The Tenth Amendment would be necessary as an
independent check on Congress’s power to enact generally applicable laws only
when those laws were “destructive of state sovereignty or violative of [a]
constitutional provision.”342
Legislation that preempts state regulatory decrees does not appear to run
afoul of this first limitation under Garcia. Such legislation has no more adverse
effect on state sovereignty than any other congressional act that preempts state
legislation. In other words, legislation that retakes a field affects state
sovereignty only insofar as it displaces prior state regulation. Unless the Tenth
Amendment is construed to trump the Supremacy Clause, federal legislation
that displaces—or as it is commonly called, preempts—state law does not
destroy state sovereignty under Garcia. Indeed, such legislation would pass
muster even under the stricter test espoused in National League of Cities, since
it does not “address matters that are indisputably ‘attribute[s] of state
sovereignty.’”343 Accordingly, the first limitation does not preclude
congressional efforts to legislate in a field already regulated by state consent
decrees.
The second major limitation the Tenth Amendment imposes on
congressional action arises when Congress tries to regulate the states in their
sovereign capacity with legislation that is not “generally applicable.”
Admittedly, Congress has some latitude in this area. It may, for instance, induce
states to voluntarily exercise their sovereign power to legislate by making the
receipt of federal funds contingent on the states’ willingness to exercise that
power in a way Congress finds desirable, as Congress did when it withheld
federal highway funds from states that refused to enact laws that mimicked the
congressionally preferred speed limit or legal drinking age.344 Alternatively,
Congress may induce states to voluntarily regulate an activity as Congress
would like by “offer[ing] States the choice of regulating that activity according
340. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
341. Id. at 555.
342. Id. at 554.
343. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (alteration
in original) (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845).
344. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987); see also New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 167 (1992); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478-80 (1980); Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 U.S. 444, 461-62 (1978); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974); Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947).
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to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation,” as
Congress did with the Clean Water Act and the Occupational Safety and Health
Act.345
But Congress unconstitutionally infringes upon the state sovereignty secured
by the Tenth Amendment when it “command[s] a state government to enact
state legislation.”346 The Court has expounded upon this limitation in a number
of its recent cases. In New York v. United States,347 the Court considered the
constitutionality of the “take title” provision of the Low Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. That provision “offer[ed] state
governments a ‘choice’ of either accepting ownership of [low-level radioactive]
waste or [enacting] regula[tions] according to the instructions of Congress.”348
The Court concluded that both alternatives were beyond the power of Congress.
Requiring states to take ownership of, and to assume the liability for,
radioactive waste amounted to a “congressionally compelled subsidy from state
governments to radioactive waste producers.”349 At the same time, requiring
states to promulgate regulations “present[ed] a simple command to state
governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress.”350 The latter
alternative violated the Tenth Amendment because Congress was
“‘commandeer[ing] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”351
In Printz v. United States,352 the Court expanded New York’s holding when
examining the interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act.353 These temporary provisions required a prospective gun buyer to
complete a “Brady Form,” which requires disclosure of personal information
and a sworn statement that the buyer is not among any of the classes of persons
prohibited from owning handguns. At issue in Printz was the provision that
required a state law enforcement officer to receive the Brady Forms, to “make a
reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or
possession [of the handgun] would be in violation of the law,” and to destroy the
345. New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 764-65 (1982).
346. New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
347. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
348. Id. at 175; see 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1994).
349. New York, 505 U.S. at 175.
350. Id. at 176.
351. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
352. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
353. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994).
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Forms if no basis for objection arose.354 Th  Court found this provision
amounted to “the forced participation of the States’ executive in the actual
administration of a federal program.”355 Consistent with its prior holding in New
York that congressional efforts to commandeer a state’s legislature violated the
Tenth Amendment, the Court in Printz held that Congress’s attempt in the
Brady Act to commandeer a state’s executive officers ran afoul of the Tenth
Amendment.356
Legislation that displaces state regulatory consent decrees does not in any
way “compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, [a]
federal regulatory program[]” for the simple reason that such a law is aimed at
regulating individuals, not states.357 In fact, the Court in New York expressly
distinguished this type of legislation from the type of legislation that improperly
tramples upon the sovereignty of the states. The Court observed: “No matter
how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give
Congress the authority to require the states to regulate. The Constitution instead
gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to pre-empt
contrary state regulation.”358
On the basis of this language, the Court observed that Congress would have
raised no Tenth Amendment issue had the Radioactive Amendments Act
“address[ed] the problem of waste disposal by directly regulating the generators
and disposers of waste . . . [instead of] impermissibly direct[ing] the States to
regulate in this field.”359
Given this discussion, legislation that displaces state decrees would not seem
to violate the Tenth Amendment because it constitutes a direct regulation of the
private parties in the regulated field and does not command the state to exercise
its sovereign powers in a particular way.
III. THE STATUTORY REPLACEMENT FOR THE DECREES
That the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from eliminating or
modifying regulatory consent decrees does not mean that congressional efforts
to retake a field are in the clear, however. As noted above, retaking the field is a
354. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2)).
355. Id. at 2376.
356. “[T]he Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive
action, federal regulatory programs.” Id. at 2380.
357. Id.
358. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
359. Id. at 160.
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two-step process: Congress must first eliminate or modify the prior decrees and
then enact a new federal scheme of legislation to take their place.360 The manner
in which this new legislative scheme accounts for the prior scheme of judicial
regulation may itself raise additional constitutional issues.
Congress can elect to ignore that the individuals or firms subject to its new
legislative scheme were treated differently by the courts—either because some
were subject to decrees while others were not, or because they were treated
differently under the same decree. As noted above, the PLRA fits within this
model, for it requires all prison reform decrees, whether old or new, to adhere to
its new standard.361 With this type of legislation, Congress’s attempt to retake
the field raises no additional constitutional issues.
Alternatively, Congress can elect to carry forward into its new regulatory
scheme some (or all) of the distinctions previously drawn by the state or federal
court decrees. Congress did this in the Telecommunications Act when it treated
the Bell operating companies differently from other carriers as to the
circumstances under which they could offer long-distance telephone service.362
Of course, drawing distinctions is not in itself unconstitutional, for the equal
protection guarantee contemplates that Congress has the power to do so. But the
Equal Protection guarantee also requires that Congress exercise that power in a
rational manner.
When distinctions are drawn on the basis of prior decrees, moreover,
Congress is likely to refer to the decree—or the parties subject to the decree—
specifically by name. The Telecommunications Act did thus when it referred to
the Bell operating companies by name and required them (and only them) to
obtain FCC approval before entering much of the long-distance telephone
market.363 When Congress names specific persons and subjects them to
regulatory burdens not faced by others, the resulting law less clearly resembles
traditional legislation, which draws distinctions based on general characteristics
and leaves it to the courts to decide who has those characteristics.364 Instead, it
360. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
361. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (Supp. II 1996) (requiring all new decrees to be preceded by certain
findings); id. § 3626(b)(2) (requiring termination of prior decrees unless judge makes required findings).
362. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-272 (Supp. II 1996).
363. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(a) (noting that no “Bell operating company” could provide long-distance
telephone service except as provided in that section, which outlined FCC approval process); id.
§ 153(4)(A),(B) (defining “Bell operating company” as one of 20 named companies and “any successor
or assign of any such company”). The Telecommunications Act places similar restrictions on the Bell
companies’ ability to enter other markets. See 47 U.S.C. § 273 (equipment manufacturing); id. § 273
(electronic publishing); id. § 275 (alarm monitoring).
364. “It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of
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looks more like a bill of attainder, which is a legislative act that singles out
certain persons for punishment.
This Article next discusses whether legislation that borrows the distinctions
drawn by prior decrees violates the Bill of Attainder Clause or the Equal
Protection guarantee.
A. The Bill of Attainder Clause
Although the Constitution explicitly prohibits Congress from enacting a bill
of attainder,365 it does not define what one is. Originally, the term was reserved
for “parliamentary Act[s] sentencing a named individual or identifiable
members of a group to death.”366 T e Supreme Court, however, has refused to
read the Constitution’s Bill of Attainder Clause as such “a narrow, technical
(and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition.”367 Ins ead, it has viewed the
Clause “as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard
against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply—trial by
legislature.”368 Accordingly, the Court has given the term bill of attainder a
more expansive meaning that encompasses any “statute[] that inflict[s]
punishment on [a] specified individual or group.”369Thus, a statute will qualify
as a bill of attainder if: (i) it specifies, or singles out, certain individuals or
groups370 and (ii) it “punishes” them.371 Given this definition, federal regulatory
legislation that retakes the field will probably not violate the Bill of Attainder
Clause.
1. Specificity
society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other
departments.” Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810); see also United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437, 454 n.29 (1965) (“a legislature can provide that persons possessing certain characteristics must
abstain from certain activities, but must leave to other tribunals the task of deciding who possess those
characteristics”).
365. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed.”).
366. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977).
367. Brown, 381 U.S. at 442.
368. Id.
369. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 851 (1984).
370. The Supreme Court has yet to rule that the Clause applies to corporations, although it has hinted
in dicta that it might. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995) (observing
that “[e]ven laws that impose a duty or liability upon a single individual or firm are not on that account
invalid—or else we would not have the extensive jurisprudence that we do concerning the Bill of
Attainder Clause.” (emphasis added)).
371. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1998), petitions for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. (U.S. Dec. 28, 1998) (No. 98-1046), 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999) (No. 98-1153).
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For a statute to be “specific” within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder
Clause, it need not name a particular person or group. The Supreme Court
rejected any such stringent requirement in its first bill of attainder case,
Cummings v. Missouri.372 In that case, the Court evaluated an amendment to
the Missouri Constitution that prohibited any person from practicing law, or
from serving in the clergy or in public office, unless he took an oath swearing
that he had not been a Confederate sympathizer.373 The Court recognized that
“bills [of attainder] are generally directed against individuals by name; but they
may be directed against a whole class.”374
The Court followed the same reasoning in the companion case to
Cummings, Ex parte Garland.375 There, the Court held that a federal statute
that barred all Confederate sympathizers from practicing law in the federal
courts was specific enough to constitute a bill of attainder.376 Look g back, it is
easy to understand why the Court was willing to loosen the specificity
requirement in those cases. If it had not, it would have been unable to strike
those laws down because in 1866 the most logical tool for striking down
legislation drawing irrational distinctions—the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause—had not yet been enacted. But whatever the Court’s initial
reason for defining the specificity requirement so broadly, the definition was
never subsequently narrowed. The definition has been relied upon as recently as
1965 when the Court struck down a statute that made it a crime for persons
recently associated with the Communist party to serve as an officer or employee
of a labor union.377
Because the specificity element is so easy to satisfy, however, the Court has
been careful to stress that specificity alone does not make a law a bill of
attainder: “[S]imple reference to the breadth of the Act’s focus cannot be
determinative of the reach of the Bill of Attainder Clause as a limitation upon
legislative action that disadvantages a person or group.”378 On that basis, the
Court in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services379 sustained a law that
required President Nixon (but no other former President) to turn over his
372. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
373. See id. at 281 (reproducing section 9 of Article 2 of the Missouri Constitution).
374. Id. at 323.
375. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
376. See id. at 377-78.
377. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
378. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 470 n.31; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9
(1995) (“The premise that there is something wrong with particularized legislative action is of course
questionable.”).
379. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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Presidential papers to the Administrator of General Services for archiving.
Although the statute applied to only one person, the Court ultimately concluded
that it was not a bill of attainder because the burdens it imposed on him did not
rise to the level of punishment.380
Such targeted legislation is not unique and has been sustained by the Court
in numerous other decisions not involving a bill of attainder challenge. In the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,381 for instance, the Court found the
Rail Act consistent with the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution,382 even
though the law detailed a mandatory bankruptcy program for eight railroads.383
Similarly, in Robertson, the Court found no constitutional infirmity with a
statute that changed the meaning of five environmental statutes only as they
applied to the parties involved in three named lawsuits.384
As this precedent implies, the power to decide that certain persons be treated
differently—even if they are named—is not an inherently judicial power. Thus,
Congress may choose to name specific persons in a statute without violating the
separation of powers guarantee.385 That Congress might choose these particular
persons because they were subject to a decree does not change the fact that
380. See id. at 472-84; see also BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding
section 271 of the Telecommunications Act, which bars the Bell operating companies from participating
in most of the long-distance market without first obtaining FCC approval); SBC Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding sections 271 through 275 of Telecommunications Act,
which bar the Bell operating companies from participating in certain markets, even though statute
specifically named 20 companies), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144
F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding section 274 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which bars Bell
operating companies from directly offering electronic publishing services until February 8, 2000),
petitions for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Dec. 28, 1998) (No. 98-1046), 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan.
19, 1999) (No. 98-1153); Dehainaut v. Peña, 32 F.3d 1066 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that Government’s
policy that permanently barred FAA employees who had gone on strike in 1981 from future employment
with the FAA or related agencies was not a bill of attainder, despite its specificity, because it did not
constitute punishment).
381. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
382. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish . . . uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”).
383. 419 U.S. at 159-60.
384. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). The lower federal courts have
sustained similar legislation. In Maine Central Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees, 813 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1987), the First Circuit sustained a federal law that extended the
normal cooling-off period prescribed by federal labor law as to one particular labor dispute. The court
reasoned that “[a] classification does not become irrational or unconstitutional solely because it is
specific.” Id. at 490. The Ninth Circuit in Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554 (9th Cir.
1996), upheld a law that redefined the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act and
Endangered Species Act for the purposes of one lawsuit.
385. “Nothing in the Constitution says that a statute must be general in form to be legislative in
nature.” Maine Cent. R.R., 813 F.2d at 493.
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Congress’s exercise of that power does not encroach upon the judicial branch.386
It is only when Congress names these people and punishes them that it exercises
a judicial power and offends the separation of powers guarantee and the Bill of
Attainder Clause that gives it effect. Accordingly, whether a statute that retakes
a field is constitutional under the Bill of Attainder Clause turns on whether the
burdens it imposes on the named individuals constitute punishment.
386. See, e.g., BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that “[i]t was
perfectly proper for the legislature to look at [a prior consent decree]” when retaking telecommunications
field).
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2. Punishment
The Bill of Attainder Clause is a prohibition on the power of Congress only
insofar as Congress attempts to express its condemnation of certain persons by
subjecting them to burdens they did not previously bear. At a very minimum,
therefore, a statute cannot be a bill of attainder unless it makes the persons it
specifies worse off than they were before the law’s enactment. If, for example,
Congress passed a law conferring a new benefit on a group of persons, but
withheld that benefit from a subset of that group, the subset of persons has not
been punished, or even burdened, by Congress’s refusal to extend the new
benefit to them. The Supreme Court recognized this in Cummings, when it held
that the universe of potential punishments included “[t]he deprivation of any
rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed.”387
This threshold requirement—that the statute imposes a burden upon
specified persons—is of particular significance when examining the
constitutionality of congressional legislation that retakes a field. If the
replacement legislation does no more than maintain the status quo by codifying
the displaced consent decrees, it would not deprive the parties previously subject
to those decrees of any rights they previously enjoyed. For that reason, it would
not punish or even burden them within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder
Clause. The same conclusion follows when the replacement legislation relieves
the parties of some of the prior decrees’ restrictions and thereby benefits
them.388 Thus, it is only when the replacement legislation changes the status quo
in such a way as to make the specified parties worse off that the Bill of
Attainder Clause is even implicated. In such a case, it becomes necessary to
determine whether the newly imposed burdens qualify as punishment.
The Court has been rather liberal in defining the burdens that might be
punishment within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause. As early as
387. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866) (emphasis added).
388. The D.C. Circuit recognized as much when it concluded that the provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that replaced the AT&T Consent Decree were not bills of attainder. See
BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding comparison of “a party’s status
before and after the enactment of regulatory legislation” “relevent” to analysis of “whether the legislation
inflicts punishment”); BellSouth v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 66 (1998) (giving weight to fact that Act “as a
whole relieves the [Bell companies] of several of the burdens imposed by the [AT&T Consent Decree]”),
petitions for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Dec. 28, 1998) (No. 98-1046), 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan.
19, 1999) (No. 98-1153). Federal statues that lessen burdens previously imposed by a consent decree
certainly do not punish.
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1810, the Court in Fletcher v. Peck389 acknowledged that punishment under the
Clause reached beyond the punishment of death that accompanied classic bills
of attainder: “A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may
confiscate his property, or may do both.”390 Fif y years later, in Cummings v.
Missouri, the Court expanded the range of possible punishments to include
“[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed . . . the
circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this
fact.”391 Thus, it would seem that many categories of legislatively imposed
burdens could qualify as punishment as long as they deprive a person of a right
previously enjoyed.
Nevertheless, the Court has kept the universe of burdens that qualify as
punishment rather small. The Court has made clear that “[f]orbidden legislative
punishment is not involved merely because the Act imposes burdensome
consequences.”392 Indeed, if it was, the Bill of Attainder Clause would become
the weapon of choice among litigants seeking to strike down any law that
imposed burdens. Given the Clause’s lax specificity requirement, the Bill of
Attainder Clause would likely render the equal protection guarantee a dead
letter. A plaintiff suing under the Equal Protection Clause would have to prove
that a burden-imposing law was irrational, while a plaintiff suing under the Bill
of Attainder Clause would only have to show that the law imposed a burden—
rational or not.393 To avoid this result, the Court has developed a three-part test
assessing whether a particular legislatively imposed burden constitutes
punishment. Under this test, the Court asks: “(1) whether the challenged statute
falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the
statute, ‘viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed,
reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes’; and (3)
whether the legislative record ‘evinces a congressional intent to punish.’”394
Few burdens have satisfied the test’s first prong. The punishments
389. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
390. Id. at 138. In England a bill that confiscated property or imposed other penalties short of death
on specific persons was called a “bill of pains and penalties.” Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 474 (1977).
391. 71 U.S. at 320.
392. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472 (1977).
393. “However expansive the prohibition against bills of attainder, it surely was not intended to serve
as a variant of the equal protection doctrine, invalidating every Act of Congress or the states that
legislatively burdens some persons or groups but not all other plausible individuals.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at
471 (footnotes omitted).
394. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984)
(quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475-76, 478).
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accompanying classic bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties—death,
banishment, imprisonment, and confiscation of property—certainly satisfy this
prong.395 In Cummings v. Missouri, the Court added to this short list
“[d]isqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avocation,” which it
acknowledged “often has been, imposed as punishment,” at least where the basis
for disqualification had “no possible relation to [the disqualified party’s] fitness
for those pursuits and professions.”396 The Court has subsequently declined to
recognize any further forms of historical punishment.397
Each of the five laws the Court has struck down as a bill of attainder
imposed the same type of burden that the Court in Cummings found was a
historical form of punishment. In Cummings itself, and in its companion case
Ex parte Garland, the Court struck down laws that barred previously qualified
lawyers and clergymen who were Confederate sympathizers from again
practicing law or participating in the clergy.398In United States v. Lovett,399 the
Court drew upon Cummings and Ex parte Garland to invalidate a federal law
that barred three named federal employees from any further Government
employment after Congress determined they were Communist subversives.400
The statute in Lovett punished the named persons because it “‘operate[d] as a
legislative decree of perpetual exclusion’ from a chosen vocation.”401 Simil rly,
395. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473-74.
396. 71 U.S. at 319-20. There is a strong argument that foreclosing corporations from certain lines
of business should not be considered punitive at all because at the time the Constitution was ratified, states
had plenary control over whether a corporation could continue to exist and over the lines of business in
which it engaged. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contracts Clause: The
Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
94-95 (1986) (noting that, in 1800s, “state power to amend corporate charters was a most potent
technique for gaining effective, but uncompensated, control of a corporation and its assets”); see also
Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 195 N.Y. 565, 566 (1909) (Cullen, C.J., concurring) (noting how, at
turn of century, “control of the [state] legislature over [foreign corporations] is fully as plenary as in the
case of domestic corporations”), quoted in James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and
Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 380-81
(1989).
397. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (holding that denial of Social Security
benefits payable to aliens who are deported on certain enumerated grounds did not qualify as punishment);
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473-75 (holding that withholding custody of Presidential records did not qualify as
historical punishment); Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 852-53 (holding that failure to provide financial
loans to students who failed to sign up for draft did not qualify as historical punishment).
398. Cummings, 71 U.S. 277 (1866); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866). The
Court invalidated a similar West Virginia law on the same grounds in Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 234 (1872).
399. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
400. See id. at 315-18.
401. Id. at 316 (quoting Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 377).
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in United States v. Brown402—the most recent Supreme Court case to strike
down a law as a bill of attainder—the Court concluded that section 504 of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 punished former
Communist Party members by making it illegal for them to continue to serve as
an officer or employee of a labor union for five years after their involvement
with the Party.403 The Court found that the statute punished the Party members
by disqualifying them “‘from the pursuits of a lawful avocation’”—in that case,
active participation in a labor union.404
Not every law that bars a person from a certain profession qualifies as
historical punishment, however. Where the reason for the bar has a rational
“connection with [the] profession,” it is not punishment but a valid regulation of
the profession.405 In Hawker v. New York,406 for example, the Court held that
New York could bar felons from practicing medicine because it could rationally
require good character as a qualification for practicing medicine and could view
a felony conviction as evidence of the lack of such character.407 Simil rly, the
Court in DeVeau v. Braisted408 upheld a law that effectively forbid dockside
unions from employing convicted felons as officers or agents, after noting that
such restrictions “insure against corruption in specified, vital areas.”409
Line-of-business restrictions, for the same reasons, are usually not
punishment. The Court implied as much in Brown when it cited with approval
its prior decision in Board of Governors v. Agnew,410 which had upheld on
other grounds a conflict-of-interest statute that precluded employees of
securities underwriting firms from working for banks that belong to the Federal
Reserve System.411 As a result, legislation like the Glass-Steagall Act412 that
precludes commercial banks from entering the business of investment banking,
or agency regulations like the FCC’s rules that preclude broadcasters from
entering the same community’s newspaper business,413 do ot qualify as
402. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
403. See id. at 456-62.
404. Id. at 448 (quoting Cummings, 71 U.S. at 320).
405. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889) (upholding state’s power to prescribe
qualifications to practice medicine, notwithstanding Cummings and Ex parte Garland).
406. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
407. See id. at 195-97.
408. 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion).
409. Id. at 158-59.
410. 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
411. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 453-54 (citing Agnew, 329 U.S. at 449).
412. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78 (1994).
413. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1997).
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punishment.414
The court’s inquiry into punishment does not end when it finds that a burden
resembles a historical form of punishment, although there is some disagreement
among federal circuit court judges on this point.415 The court must still ask
whether the burden, “viewed in terms of [its] type and severity . . . , reasonably
can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes.”416 The Supreme Court
implicitly engaged in this inquiry in Cummings, Lovett, and Brown when it
examined whether the vocational exclusions had any relation to the legitimate
regulation of the vocation.417 If resemblance to historical punishment was
enough in itself to compel the conclusion that a burden is punishment, the Court
would have had no reason in those cases to inquire into the purpose of those
burdens. Thus, under the Court’s precedent, a court must examine the reasons
animating even those burdens that resemble historical punishment. The court
must also ask this question when considering burdens that do not resemble
historical punishment to account for “the possibility that new burdens and
deprivations might be legislatively fashioned that are inconsistent with the bill of
attainder guarantee.”418
During this second inquiry, a law will be deemed to have a nonpunitive
legislative purpose if its ultimate goal is legitimate and nonpenal, and the
burdens it imposes reasonably can be said to further that goal.419 This test
reflects the common sense notion that a law that lacks a legitimate goal or
imposes burdens that fail to reasonably achieve that goal is more likely to be
serving an ulterior, and potentially punitive, end.420 This is not a particularly
414. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding FCC
broadcasting regulations, but not addressing Bill of Attainder Clause).
415. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 242 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Nothing in
Selective Service suggests that the historical punishment test is ever dispositive on its own.”), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999); Dehainaut v. Peña, 32 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Even where a
fixed identifiable group . . . is singled out and a burden traditionally associated with punishment . . . is
imposed, the enactment may pass scrutiny under bill of attainder analysis if it seeks to achieve legitimate
and non-punitive ends and was not clearly the product of punitive intent.”). But see SBC
Communications, 154 F.3d at 200 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“Once a court determines that Congress has
imposed a burden historically deemed punitive . . . that is the end of the analysis.”).
416. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475-76 (1977).
417. See supra notes 396-404 and accompanying text.
418. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475; accord BellSouth v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
419. The D.C. Circuit recently adopted what might be considered a more stringent test, insisting that
“the non-punitive aims of an apparently prophylactic measure [be] sufficiently clear and convincing.”
BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1998), petitions for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. (U.S.
Dec. 28, 1998) (No. 98-1046), 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999) (No. 98-1153). Because the
statutes under consideration passed muster, it is difficult to know whether the difference in standards is
anything more than semantic.
420. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 476.
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difficult standard to meet. To be sure, the laws in Cummings and Ex parte
Garland failed to pass muster, but those laws, which precluded Confederate
sympathizers from acting as lawyers and clerics, bore little to no relation to
fitness to practice in those professions. The Court seemed to apply a greater
level of scrutiny in Brown when it struck down the law that precluded
Communist Party members from actively participating in labor unions.421 The
Court found that the ban did not sufficiently serve the admittedly legitimate goal
of screening from union jobs those persons most likely to instigate political
strikes.422 The Court suspected that Congress’s willingness to generalize that all
Party members would have a predilection to strike, while no others would,
revealed that the law really served a different, less legitimate purpose—to
“inflict[] [a] deprivation upon the members of a political group thought to
present a threat to the national security.”423
The Court’s other decisions have given Congress seemingly greater leeway
than given in Brown. In Flemming v. Nestor,424 the Court concluded that a law
terminating the payment of Social Security benefits to aliens deported on certain
grounds (including membership in the Communist Party) rationally served the
legitimate goal of stopping payments to persons who were outside the
country.425 In Nixon, the Court concluded that the burden imposed by
Congress’s decision to grant temporary custody of President Nixon’s
presidential papers to the Administrator of General Services was justified
because it served the legitimate purpose of safeguarding the papers, both for
history and as evidence for Watergate-related proceedings.426 In Selective
Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group,427 t e Court
found that the denial of federal financial assistance to college students who
failed to register for the draft served the legitimate, nonpunitive goal of
encouraging compliance with the registration laws.428
As a final matter, a law that serves a legitimate, nonpunitive purpose may
still be considered punishment if the legislative history indicates that Congress
intended the burden to be punitive. Invalidation on the basis of illicit
congressional motive is rare, however, because “unmistakable evidence of
421. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
422. See id. at 455-56.
423. Id. at 453.
424. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
425. See id. at 617.
426. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 476-77 (1977).
 427. 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
428. Id. at 853-56.
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punitive intent . . . is required before a Congressional enactment of this kind
may be struck down.”429 In fact, the only case to place much weight upon such
evidence was Lovett.430 In that case, the Court reviewed a federal statute that
effectively barred three named persons from further federal employment. The
statute was passed after the congressional Committee on Un-American
Activities “conducted a series of investigations and made lists of people and
organizations it thought ‘subversive.’”431 The House Report accompanying the
legislation stated that the “views and philosophies” of the three individuals
“constitute[d] subversive activity.”432 In striking down this legislation, the Court
stated:
No one would think that Congress could have passed a valid law,
stating that after investigation it had found Lovett, Dodd, and Watson
“guilty” of the crime of engaging in “subversive activities,” defined that
term for the first time, and sentenced them to perpetual exclusion from
any government employment. Section 304, while it does not use that
language, accomplishes that result.433
It is fair to say that few pieces of legislation will again be accompanied by such
unmistakable evidence of illicit congressional motive.
Under this tripartite definition of punishment, economic legislation that
distinguishes among specific persons on the basis of whether they were
previously subject to a consent decree is unlikely to be struck down as a bill of
attainder unless there is no rational reason to treat the persons differently. This
is because any legislation that imposes burdens on the named parties is likely to
rationally serve a legitimate, nonpunitive motive. Thus, this legislation will fail
to meet the second test for punishment, even if the burden itself happens to
resemble a historical form of punishment.
3. Application of These Principles
The recent flurry of litigation over the constitutionality of the Special
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996434 has involved this precise
bill of attainder issue. These Provisions impose a number of restrictions on the
429. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960).
430. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
431. Id. at 308.
432. Id. at 312.
433. Id. at 316.
434. 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-275 (Supp. II 1996).
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ability of the Bell operating companies to enter the markets of long-distance
telephone service,435 quipment manufacturing,436 electronic publishing,437 and
alarm monitoring.438 These restrictions more or less track those contained in the
AT&T Consent Decree that the Act superseded.439
In the first of these cases, SBC, one of the five regional conglomerates of
Bell operating companies, brought a facial challenge to the five Special
Provisions.440 SBC argued that the Provisions amounted to an unconstitutional
bill of attainder because they singled out the Bell companies by name and
punished them by placing restrictions on their participation in certain markets.
Judge Kendall, a district court judge in the Northern District of Texas, agreed
with SBC’s argument that these Provisions were bills of attainder because the
burdens they imposed amounted to punishment under the Court’s three-part
test.441
Judge Kendall first found that the Special Provisions’ market entry
restrictions resembled historic punishment because, like the law in Cummings,
they “prevent the [Bell companies] from engaging in a lawful business.”442 The
court then concluded that the restrictions served no legitimate, nonpunitive
purpose. The Government had argued that the restrictions were little more than
line-of-business restrictions justified in light of findings in the AT&T Decree
that the Bell companies might use their monopoly in the local telephone market
to impede competition in other markets. The court rejected this argument,
finding instead that Congress’s reliance on the prior decree tainted the
subsequent legislation. In the court’s view, “Congress independently has
adjudicated the [Bell companies] guilty of antitrust violations”443 and pu ished
them for “the sins of the parent, AT&T.”444 The court also found that the
435. See id. §§ 271-272.
436. See id. § 273.
437. See id. § 274.
438. See id. § 275.
439. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
440. SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997), rev’d, 154 F.3d 226
(5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
441. See id. at 1004-07. The court had little trouble concluding that sections 271 through 275
satisfied the specificity element, given that they applied to the 20 Bell companies by name. See id. at
1003-04; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-275 (Supp. II 1996) (referring to “a Bell operating company”); id.
§ 153(4) (listing 20 Bell companies by name).
442. SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1005. The court did not consider whether these were
lines of business in which the Bell companies previously had enjoyed a right to participate.
443. Id. at 1007.
444. Id. at 1005.
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legislative history of the Act revealed an intent on the part of Congress to punish
the Bell companies because some of the legislators referred to the AT&T
Decree in their comments.445
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Special Provisions did
not constitute punishment.446 The court agreed with Judge Kendall insofar as he
noted that the Act’s market entry restrictions resembled the vocational bars that
previous Supreme Court decisions found to be a historical form of
punishment.447 But the court did not find that resemblance dispositive. Instead,
the court drew upon language in Cummings and Garland and the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Dent and Hawker to conclude that “a properly crafted
prophylactic measure could survive attainder analysis, even where the finding of
a propensity for future conduct was based solely on past acts, and the result was
a bar from future employment.”448 The court found the Special Provisions to be
just such a measure—“a prophylactic, compromise regulation of the [Bell
operating companies’] local market power to ensure greater competition in all of
the nation’s telecommunications markets.”449 Th  court held that this fit within
what it loosely referred to as the “‘prophylactic’ exception to the Bill of
Attainder Clause.”450 This conclusion, along with the fact that none of the
market restrictions were permanent, led the court to further conclude that the
Special Provisions were not historical punishment, that they served a legitimate,
nonpunitive purpose, and that they were not enacted to punish.451
Judge Smith dissented.452 To him, the fact that the Telecommunications
Act’s market restrictions resembled the historical punishment of an employment
bar was the end of the inquiry.453 He rejected as irrelevant the temporary
duration of the Special Provisions454 a d disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that the Supreme Court’s precedent admitted of any prophylactic
445. See id. at 1007. Curiously, Judge Kendall also concluded that section 601(a)(1) of the 1996
Act, which effectively terminated the AT&T Consent Decree, was severable from sections 271 through
275 without any discussion of whether section 601(a) was itself consitutional under the separation of
powers guarantee.  See supra Part I.
446. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
889 (1999).
447. See id. at 236-37.
448. Id. at 237.
449. Id. at 243-44.
450. Id. at 237.
451. See id. at 241-44.
452. See id. at 247-53 (Smith, J., dissenting).
453. See id. at 250 (Smith, J., dissenting).
454. See id. at 248-49 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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exception.455 Judge Smith further concluded that the Special Provisions offended
the separation of powers concerns underlying the Bill of Attainder Clause
because the Provisions imposed punishment on specific persons, in derogation
of Congress’s limited power to “legislate in general terms.”456
At the same time that SBC pressed its bill of attainder challenge in the Texas
district court, BellSouth, another of the Regional Bell conglomerates, brought
similar challenges in the D.C. Circuit to sections 271 and 274 of the Act. In the
first case, the court rejected the argument that section 274 constituted
punishment, notwithstanding the fact that its four-year ban on Bell company
participation in the electronic publication market effectively reimposed one of
the Consent Decree’s terms that had been previously lifted.457 The two-judge
majority acknowledged that section 274 resembled historical punishment insofar
as it precluded the Bell companies from entering a certain occupation.
Nevertheless, the court found the analogy not entirely accurate because section
274 still permitted the Bell companies to participate in the market through a
joint venture or a structurally separate affiliate.458 The majority stated that it
would have found no fault with section 274 even if it had imposed an absolute
bar because the burden was “nothing more than a line-of-business
restriction.”459
The BellSouth majority also concluded that section 274 served a nonpunitive
purpose. To begin with, section 274 “has the earmarks of a rather conventional
response to commonly perceived risks of anticompetitive behavior.”460 Th
majority refused to infer punitive intent from the fact that section 274 reimposed
a restriction previously lifted by the district court at the behest of the Justice
Department. In the court’s view, Congress was free to read the evidence
warranting the need for the restriction differently than the district court.461The
reimposition of the electronic publishing restriction was, moreover, placed “in
an Act that as a whole relieves the [Bell companies] of several of the burdens
455. See id. at 249-50 (Smith, J., dissenting).
456. Id. at 252 (Smith, J., dissenting).
457. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998), petitions for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. (U.S. Dec. 28, 1998) (No. 98-1046), 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999) (No. 98-1153).
458. See id. at 64-65.
459. Id. at 65.
460. Id.
461. “Congress’s reading of the evidence in 1996 was different from the one arrived at by the
Department of Justice in 1987—or by this court in 1993 for that matter. It does not follow from these
conflicts between branches, however, that Congress cannot rationally be said to have pursued nonpunitive
purposes in enacting § 274.” Id. at 66.
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imposed by the [AT&T Consent Decree].”462 The majority also found nothing
“suggestive of punitive purpose nor particularly suspicious” in Congress’s
decision not to subject GTE, another large but more diffuse conglomerate of
local telephone companies, to a similar electronic publishing restriction in light
of differences between GTE and the Bells.463 As a final matter, the majority saw
insufficient evidence of a punitive motive in the legislative history.464
Judge Sentelle dissented.465 He noted that “[m]ere specificity may not make
an act a bill of attainder, but in most cases the [Supreme] Court has required
little more.”466 In his view, the only thing that prevented all laws that impose
burdens on named persons from being bills of attainder was the Supreme
Court’s decision in Nixon, a decision he felt was unique and therefore usually
distinguishable.467 Not surprisingly, Judge Sentelle’s conclusion that section 274
punished the Bell companies hinged primarily on the fact that it specifically
named them. He first cited the “history of treating line-of-business restrictions
as punishment” and concluded that section 274 therefore met the first test of
punishment.468 He then registered his disagreement with the majority’s finding
that section 274 resembled a legitimate line-of-business restriction that served a
nonpunitive purpose, finding instead that “[b]y naming the companies . . . it
seems apparent that Congress aimed, not at protecting present and future
markets from potential abuse of monopoly power, but at punishing those named
companies’ past anticompetitive behavior.”469 As for the final step, he found
that “when Congress define[s] the burdened class by name rather than by
characteristic or future action, I can discern no other motive than an intent to
react to (read ‘punish’) the past conduct of those named persons.”470
Seven months later, the D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge to section 271 of
the Act, which precluded the Bell companies from entering much of the long-
distance telephone market until they first obtained regulatory approval from the
FCC.471 Because section 271, like section 274, applied only to the Bell
462. Id.
463. Id. at 67.
464. See id.
465. See id. at 71-74 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Judge Sentelle agreed with the majority’s conclusion
that section 274 did not violate the First Amendment rights of the Bell companies. See id. at 71 (Sentelle,
J., dissenting).
466. Id. at 72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
467. See id. at 72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
468. Id. at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
469. Id. at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
470. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
471. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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companies by name, the court found that section 271 was “specific,” but
observed that “satisfaction of the specificity prong alone is not sufficient to find
that a particular law implicates the bill of attainder clause, let alone violates
it.”472 The court went on to conclude that section 271 did not impose any
“punishment.” As it did with regard to section 274, the court held that section
271 fell outside the historical definition of punishment. The court found that the
employment bars historically regarded as punishment were so regarded because
they “violated the fundamental guarantees of political and religious freedom”
and were, in most cases, permanent.473 Because section 271 is a “run-of-the-mill
business regulation[]” that keeps the Bell companies out of the long-distance
market only until they obtain FCC approval, the court held that section 271 bore
little resemblance to “punitive” employment bars. The majority also found
“sufficiently clear and convincing evidence” that section 271 was a prophylactic
measure serving a nonpunitive purpose—that is, opening all
telecommunications markets to competition. The court also noted that, to
achieve that goal, Congress could legitimately treat the Bell companies
differently from other companies due to “the infrastructure they control” and
their “dominance in the market.”474 Lastly, the court found it relevant that
section 271 made the Bell companies no worse off—and probably better off—
than they had been under the AT&T Consent Decree.475 Judge Sentelle
concurred in the result in deference to the prior BellSouth precedent but
reiterated the criticisms he voiced in his dissent in the section 274 litigation.476
Of these opinions, the D.C. Circuit’s majority opinions upholding sections
271 and 274 of the Telecommunications Act are the ones most consistent with
the Supreme Court’s bill of attainder jurisprudence. Both Judge Sentelle’s and
Judge Smith’s dissents misapprehend the Supreme Court’s precedent. Judge
Sentelle’s position that an otherwise legitimate burden becomes punitive when it
applies only to named persons is inconsistent with the Nixon rationale, which
the Court did not purport to confine to the narrow situation before it. Given the
breadth of the Court’s definition of specificity, Judge Sentelle’s position also
would have the effect of making the equal protection guarantee irrelevant. This
is neither wise as a policy matter nor required (or indeed permitted) by
precedent. Judge Smith’s position is also inconsistent with precedent. As
472. Id. at 684.
473. Id. at 686.
474. Id. at 689-90.
475. See id. at 690-91.
476. See id. at 694-97 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
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discussed above, the Supreme Court has never found a burden’s resemblance to
a historical form of punishment dispositive. Since Cummings, there has always
been a further inquiry into whether the burden serves a rational, nonpunitive
purpose.477 Whether the Court undertakes that inquiry as part of the analysis of
whether the burden is a historical form of punishment (Selective Service’s first
prong) or as part of the analysis of whether the burden serves a legitimate,
nonpunitive goal (Selective Service’s second prong), the Supreme Court has
never held that a burden’s resemblance to historical punishment is enough in
itself to condemn the law imposing the burden as a bill of attainder. Judge
Smith’s subsequent conclusion that the Special Provisions offend the separation
of powers concerns underlying the Bill of Attainder Clause fails for much the
same reason: Legitimate market entry restrictions are not punishment, and
Congress may apply nonpunitive restrictions to specific individuals without
offending the separation of powers rationale underlying the Clause. The Clause
is not meant to “[limit] Congress to the choice of legislating for the universe, or
legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all.”478
The Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion also has its flaws. First, the court held
that the temporary duration of a burden precludes its classification as historical
punishment.479 This would not seem to be true, as it is possible to imagine a law
imposing temporary burdens that still punishes in a historical sense. For
instance, Congress could pass a law requiring named political dissidents to be
imprisoned until they swore allegiance to the United States or until a date
certain. It is nevertheless the case, however, that the “escapability” of a burden
weighs against a finding that the particular burden is punishment. This is
particularly so when the escapability is tied to the legitimate, nonpunitive reason
the burden was imposed in the first place. For example, under the
Telecommunications Act, the Bell companies are free to enter the long-distance
and equipment manufacturing markets once they open their local markets to
competition and thereby lose their ability to unfairly dominate those other
related markets.480
Second, the Fifth Circuit read the Supreme Court’s precedent as creating “a
477. See supra text accompanying notes 416-20.
478. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 (1977).
479. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
480. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271, 273 (Supp. II 1996). The D.C. Circuit in its section 271 decision
followed this reasoning in concluding that section 271 did not resemble a historical form of punishment.
See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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‘prophylactic’ exception to the Bill of Attainder Clause.”481 This is inaccurate,
even accounting for the fact that language in many of the Court’s opinions is
open-ended and vague. As discussed more fully above, the Court in Cummings,
Dent, and Hawker did not purport to create any exception. Rather it seemed to
conclude that the vocational bars in those cases were not historical punishment
at all because those bars were regulating a profession and not punishing
individuals.482 While this distinction between exception and definition may, once
applied, turn out to be little more than a semantic one, it is an important one in
theory, one that Judge Smith had some basis for criticizing in his dissent.483
The D.C. Circuit’s majority opinions, which concluded that sections 271 and
274, and by implication the remaining Special Provisions, did not punish the
Bell companies, are the opinions that seem to hew most closely to the Supreme
Court’s precedent. Although, as Judges Sentelle, Kendall, and Smith point out,
the line-of-business restrictions in sections 271 through 275 resemble the
vocational bar in Cummings, Cummings itself made clear that even vocational
restrictions are not punishment unless they have “no possible relation to [one’s]
fitness for those pursuits and professions.”484 The Special Provisions were
enacted because, in Congress’s view, the Bell companies were particularly well
situated to exploit their monopoly power in the local markets so as to adversely
affect competition in the other related markets covered by the Special
Provisions. As Nixon and Brown’s citation to Agnew establish, it is permissible
for Congress to presume that certain persons are more likely to engage in
inappropriate behavior without that presumption being punitive. Indeed, if such
a presumption was punitive, just about every conflict-of-interest statute would
be a bill of attainder. The fact that the Telecommunications Act applies such a
presumption to specific corporations does not (as Judge Sentelle contends)
transform the otherwise unremarkable market restriction into punishment. To be
sure, the underinclusiveness of a burden’s reach is relevant and may warrant
greater judicial scrutiny,485 but even laws that are underinclusive can serve
legitimate, nonpunitive purposes.486 The Supreme Court recognized as much in
481. SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 237.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 396-414.
483. See SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 249-50 (Smith, J., dissenting).
484. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319 (1866).
485. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449 n.23 (1965) (“Although it may be that
underinclusiveness is a characteristic of most bills of attainder, we doubt that it is a necessary feature.”).
486. As the Court in Plaut stated:
Even laws that impose a duty or liability upon a single individual or firm are not on that account
invalid—or else we would not have the extensive jurisprudence that we do concerning the Bill of
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Nixon, which remains good law. Thus, the Special Provisions are not a
historical form of punishment and rationally serve a legitimate, nonpunitive
economic goal. Finally, the Act’s legislative history contains only a smattering
of references to the AT&T Consent Decree, which was itself an economic (and
not punitive) decree. These references would seem to be unremarkable given
that the Act was replacing the Decree. Therefore, there is no unmistakable
evidence of punitive motive.
There is an additional, and more fundamental, reason why the Special
Provisions do not amount to a bill of attainder: they in large measure maintain
the status quo by carrying forward many of the market restrictions already
contained in the AT&T Consent Decree. As such, these provisions do not in any
meaningful way make the Bell companies worse off than they were before the
Telecommunications Act and, for that reason, do not burden—let alone
punish—those companies.487 In short, they do not rob the Bell companies of any
rights they previously enjoyed.488 To be sure, section 274 reimposes a restriction
previously lifted and in that sense makes the Bell companies worse off. But as
the D.C. Circuit noted, section 274 was part of a package that also included
provisions that benefitted the Bell companies by relieving them of some of the
Consent Decree’s restrictions.489 Section 271, as the D.C. Circuit pointed out,
lifted the Consent Decree’s effectively absolute bar on the Bell companies’ entry
into the long-distance market by immediately permitting them to offer long-
distance service in some states and to provide such service in other states once
they obtained FCC approval.490 Thus, the Special Provisions do not burden the
Bell companies and surely do not punish them.
It is therefore safe to say that when the Supreme Court’s precedent is
properly applied, a congressional law that retakes a field will not usually
constitute a bill of attainder simply because its new legislative scheme relies in
Attainder Clause, including cases which say that it requires not merely ‘singling out’ but also
punishment.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 n.33 (1977) (“the mere specificity of a law does not call into play the Bill of
Attainder Clause”).
487. See supra text accompanying notes 388-90.
488. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866); see also supra text
accompanying note 387.
489. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 66 (D.C. Cir 1998), petitions for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. (U.S. Dec. 28, 1998) (No. 98-1046), 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999) (No. 98-1153).
490. See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. II 1996); see also BellSouth Corp v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 691
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he BOCs are no worse off under [section] 271 than they were under the [AT&T
Consent Decree]; and there are many who think their position has vastly improved.”).
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part upon distinctions drawn by the earlier decrees—particularly where the new
law in some measure maintains the status quo by mimicking restrictions
contained in the displaced decrees. But this general rule may not hold true if
these distinctions are no longer rational because a distinction that fails to
rationally serve a nonpunitive purpose may be understood as a facade for a law
that punishes. Because the rationality of legislation is assessed most often under
equal protection analysis, however, it will be discussed separately below even
though it is also relevant in the bill of attainder analysis.
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B. The Equal Protection Guarantee
Legislation that distinguishes among persons on the basis of whether they
were previously subject to a consent decree, like every other law that draws a
distinction, implicates the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. The
Court’s modern equal protection scrutiny is quite deferential: The Court will
“presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations [drawn in
economic legislation] and require only that the classification challenged be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”491
The Court has consistently upheld legislation that discriminates against
specific—and even named—individuals, as long as the distinction rationally
serves a legitimate purpose. In City of New Orleans v. Dukes,492 for instance,
the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a New Orleans ordinance that banned
from the City’s French Quarter all push-cart vendors except those who had been
in business continuously for more than eight years. The Court had no problem
finding that the ordinance, which had the effect of allowing only two vendors to
remain, “rationally further[ed]” the City’s goal of “‘preserv[ing] the appearance
and custom valued by the Quarter’s residents and . . . tourists.’”493 The Court
reached a similar conclusion in Nixon when it stated that “mere
underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment . . . even if the law disadvantages an
individual or identifiable members of a group.”494 In light of this, the Court
voiced its agreement with President Nixon’s earlier decision to abandon his
equal protection challenge to the portion of the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act that required only him to hand over his papers to the
Administrator of General Services. In the Court’s view, the Act served the
legitimate purpose of preserving President Nixon’s papers for posterity and for
use in possible criminal investigations.495
Given this precedent, there appears to be nothing unconstitutional with a
statute that borrows its distinctions from prior consent decrees as long as the
distinctions are reasonable. To be sure, it may be insufficient to treat persons
differently just because they were once subject to a consent decree because that
491. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
492. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
493. Id. at 304 (quoting Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1974)).
494. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 n.33 (1977) (citations omitted).
495. See id.
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class of persons might have little more in common than that they were the only
ones who happened to be sued by the executive branch. In such a case, future
distinctions based on this ground may not be rational. But if the distinction
reflected in the new legislative scheme is rational, the fact that it coincides with a
distinction drawn in prior judicial decrees does not undercut its rationality. If
anything, it seems to reinforce its rationality because the executive and judicial
branches drew the same distinction. Thus, congressional legislation that
distinguishes among persons based on their prior regulation under consent
decrees will be consistent with the equal protection guarantee as long as that
distinction is rational.496
IV. CONCLUSION
As this Article illustrates, congressional efforts to retake a field previously
occupied by federal or state consent decrees are subject to constitutional
restrictions that are not present when Congress legislates on a clean slate. These
constraints are not insurmountable, however. As long as Congress changes the
law underlying the decree—whether by amending federal law or preempting
state decrees under the Supremacy Clause—its actions are likely to be
constitutionally unobjectionable. When displacing federal decrees, Congress
must be careful not to overstep the boundaries placed on it by the separation of
powers guarantee by conditioning the continued jurisdiction of the courts on
particular substantive outcomes or by attempting to dissolve the decrees itself.
But these pitfalls are relatively easy to avoid. Thus, should Congress wish to
continue the trend it started with the PLRA and Telecommunications Act, the
Constitution is unlikely to stand in its way.
496. The Fifth and D.C. Circuits reached this same conclusion. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162
F.3d 678, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 1998); SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 246 (5th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
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